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Our economic system counts on markets to allocate most of our societal 
resources.  The law often treats markets as discrete entities, with a native 
intelligence and structure that provides clear answers to questions about 
prices and terms.  In reality, of course, markets are much messier—they are 
agglomerations of negotiations by individual parties.  Despite theoretical 
and empirical work on markets and on negotiation, legal scholars have 
largely overlooked the connection between the two areas in considering how 
markets are constructed and regulated.
This Article brings together scholarship in law, economics, sociology, 
and psychology to better understand the role that negotiation plays in 
different types of marketplaces.  Establishing the concept of negotiation 
variance, we create a preliminary taxonomy of factors that shape such 
variance and examine the differences between markets in the effects that 
negotiation can have on transactions.  In markets with high negotiation 
variance, parties can use their negotiation effectiveness to get much better 
deals.  Although the law has not generally recognized negotiation’s role in 
markets explicitly, judges and policymakers have at times taken negotiation 
variance into account implicitly, making exceptions to standard doctrines to 
accommodate unbalanced outcomes.  The Article examines the doctrines of 
common-law contract that reflect an understanding of negotiation’s impact, 
as well as exploring three particular markets where high variance 
negotiation has a significant role: lawsuit settlements, corporate control, 
and employment.  These examples show how the law takes negotiation 
variance into account and illustrates the challenges in developing a response 
to individual negotiation differences across markets.
*Professor, Washington University School of Law.
†Callis Family Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law.  Many thanks to participants at the 
Law and Society Association Annual Meeting, the Saint Louis University School of Law workshop 
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INTRODUCTION
Negotiation—the essence of capitalism.  There’s nothing like it.1
Markets are the engine of our economy.  Rather than distributing goods 
through a command-and-control system, we rely on markets to direct 
property, goods, and services to their most efficient use.  Although the 
superiority of markets as distribution devices was at one time the subject of 
intellectual debate,2 today markets are so ingrained in our system that they 
are almost invisible.  And their domain continues to grow—more and more 
items that were thought as personal, private, or not fit for markets are now 
coming under their aegis.3
The market is also ubiquitous in legal scholarship.  The basic law and 
economics models are premised on the notion that markets are the best way 
of facilitating the exchange of goods and services to achieve the highest level 
of societal efficiency.  However, the idea of “the market” is often discussed 
as a monolithic entity—something of a black box.  As long as certain 
assumptions hold, such as perfect information, rational actors, and zero 
transaction costs, the parties will put their potential transaction into the 
“market,” and the market will in turn determine the appropriate price and 
terms for the exchange.4 But the market is not an entity in and of itself; it is 
instead a set of transactions between different parties with respect to 
particular goods or services.  The market price is simply the average of the 
prices—or even the latest price that one party has decided to pay the other.5
And that price is arrived at through negotiation.  
This Article interrogates the idea of the market as a “black box” by 
thinking more deeply about markets as negotiations.  It examines how
markets are structured and how negotiations play the central role in the 
working of the market.  It also examines how law plays a role in shaping 
those negotiations, for better or worse.6 Along with common-law contract 
law’s treatment of negotiation, we also look at specific examples of market 
1 30 Rock: Hard Ball (NBC television broadcast Feb. 22, 2007) (Jack Donaghy).
2 See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 526, 529 n.1 
(1945).
3 See Michael J. Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets (May 11–
12, 1998), in 21 THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 89, 93 (Grethe B. Peterson ed.,
2000), https://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-to-z/s/sandel00.pdf; Kim Krawiec, Kidneys 
Without Money, 175 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 4, 5 (2019).
4 PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 160 (19th ed. 2010).
5 Cf. Comm’r of Corps. & Tax’n v. Worcester Cnty. Tr. Co., 26 N.E.2d 305, 307 (Mass. 
1940) (defining market price as “the highest price which a hypothetical willing buyer would pay to 
a hypothetical willing seller in an assumed free and open market”).
6 See, e.g., Saul Levmore & Frank Fagan, The End of Bargaining in the Digital Age, 103 
CORNELL L. REV. 1469, 1470 (2018) (“Bargaining can be inefficient as well as costly, and it is 
outdated.  Law can improve efficiency and lower costs by reducing the bargaining power of 
professional, well-informed parties.”).
HOLLANDER-BLUMOFF & BODIE-SSRN (DO NOT DELETE) 12/15/2020 3:49 PM
202X] D E S K T O P  P U B L I S H I N G  E X A M P L E 103
construction through negotiation rules: the market for legal settlements, the 
market for corporate control, and the market for labor.  In these examples, 
we discuss the effects of negotiation variance in these markets and whether 
the law has taken this variance into account.
Part I explores the structure of markets within our economy, and the 
legal system’s role in constructing markets.  Part II highlights the ways in 
which some markets are merely amalgamations of individual negotiations, 
and then explores more deeply the factors that impact negotiation, focusing 
largely but not exclusively on negotiation effectiveness.  This section 
examines the contours of negotiation skill and its distinct nature as compared 
to the law and economics model of the market, such as rationality and 
information asymmetry.  Part III provides an initial taxonomy of negotiation 
variance within markets to determine which types of markets allow for 
significant negotiation effects.  Finally, Part IV discusses the role of 
negotiation in contract law generally, as well as three particular markets: the 
market for legal settlements, the market for corporate control, and the labor 
market. It teases out the importance of negotiation to each of these markets 
and discusses how negotiation variance may play a role in shaping 
transactions.  Ultimately, we must acknowledge and understand the role of 
negotiation in order to manage its effects and redress the imbalances it can 
cause.
I. MARKETS AND THE LAW
Our economic system of distribution and exchange is based primarily 
on the concept of markets.  This section explores what markets do, how they 
work, and how law shapes their structure and processes.
A. What Markets Do
Markets have a variety of definitions, depending on the purpose of the 
characterization and the methodology used in developing it.  The earliest 
conception of a market was a physical place where commercial exchange 
took place.7 But over time the “marketplace” evolved from a location to an 
understanding of the transactions that took place within that space.8 A 
7 Richard Swedberg, Max Weber’s Central Text in Economic Sociology, in THE SOCIOLOGY 
OF ECONOMIC LIFE 62, 70 (Mark Granovetter & Richard Swedberg eds., 3d ed. 2011) (“In 
describing the market, [Max] Weber says that the most obvious type of market is the one that can 
be found in one specific place.”); Rudolph J.R. Peritz, Some Realism About Economic Power in a 
Time of Sectorial Change, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 247, 252 (1997) (“There was a time when market 
identified a physical location—a place for exchange in relative safety from violent forms of 
acquisition, such as plunder.”).
8 Peritz, supra note 7, at 252 (“Later, market came to represent a functional logic, a form of 
exchange, regardless of physical location.  Most recently, market has reflected an abstract idea, an 
institutional framework whose shifting elements emerge from a series of normative judgments.”).
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market could be described simply as a set of transactions that can be 
coherently aggregated together.9 In the abstract, the concept has intuitive 
meaning, at least for those who have participated in a variety of markets.10
But the concept can be used to describe the basic phenomena from multiple 
different angles.  A market is both a set of buyers and sellers for a particular 
good, service, or property right, as well as the series of exchanges between 
these buyers and sellers involving these goods, services, or rights.11 The 
term also describes the legal, social, and economic structures that facilitate 
those exchanges.12 A particular market can be defined by the types of goods 
or services it covers, or in terms of geography, time, or kinds of participants.  
It may encompass an entire economy, or be limited to one specific good.  
The key to a market is the transaction: the exchange of one thing for 
another.  Markets allow for the exchange of goods, services, and other things 
of value between parties.13 Because the nature of trade is to exchange 
nonsimilar items, there is a commensurability problem: the parties must 
judge whether the one item (or set of items) should be traded for the other.  
For this reason, most markets operate not on a barter system, but on a sales 
system in which money is exchanged for a good or service.14 Money 
addresses the commensurability problem by creating a common unit of 
9 More abstractly, a market is the potential for those transactions.  JOHN MCMILLAN,
REINVENTING THE BAZAAR: A NATURAL HISTORY OF MARKETS 5 (2002) (proposing that a market 
for an item exists if there are people interested in buying and others interested in selling it).
10 But see Pierre Schlag, Coase Minus the Coase Theorem—Some Problems with Chicago 
Transaction Cost Analysis, 99 IOWA L. REV. 175, 216 (2013) (decrying “the lack of any robust 
theoretical conception of the market in neoclassical economics”).
11 RICHARD G. LIPSEY, PETER O. STEINER & DOUGLAS D. PURVIS, ECONOMICS 216 (7th ed. 
1984) (“From the point of view of a household, the market consists of those firms from which it 
can buy a well-defined product; from the point of view of a firm, the market consists of those buyers 
to whom it can sell a well-defined product.”); Carol Sanger, Developing Markets in Baby-Making: 
In the Matter of Baby M, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 67, 71 (2007) (noting that markets require a 
“mix of background conditions” including buyers and sellers).  
12 Christian Turner, The Segregation of Markets, 7 TEX. A&M L. REV. 299, 300–01 (2020) 
(“Indeed, when we casually use the word ‘market,’ we do so to describe not the totality of the 
attributes and activities of its participants but the mechanisms for their cooperation regarding these 
decisions.”).
13 R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 7 (1988) (“Markets are institutions 
that exist to facilitate exchange, that is, they exist in order to reduce the cost of carrying out 
exchange transactions.”).
14 Thomas S. Ulen, The Growing Pains of Behavioral Law and Economics, 51 VAND. L.
REV. 1747, 1759 (1998) (“[M]arket choices are mediated through money, making 
commensurability much easier.  We do not have problems of ‘comparing apples and oranges’ in 
many market transactions because the choices almost always involve the purchaser’s surrendering 
money.  Because the purchaser knows or could learn the market price of other goods and services 
or can compute an opportunity cost, he can make a fairly accurate estimate of the comparative 
worth of very different courses of action . . . .”).
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exchange that can be applied in a variety of contexts.15 This common unit 
of exchange also allows for the development of a common numerical 
value—a price—that indicates the amount of commensurable value 
necessary for the exchange to take place.  To the extent that comparable 
things of value have been sold within a certain period of time, there may be 
said to be a “market price” for hypothetical sales of similar things.16
Markets are thus a way of distributing the resources of a society to 
various participants in that society.17 They are contrasted with other systems 
of distribution, such as economic firms, government fiat, or tribal 
partitioning.18 As Friedrich Hayek argued in The Use of Knowledge in 
Society, “[I]n a system where the knowledge of the relevant facts is dispersed 
among many people, prices can act to coördinate the separate actions of 
different people in the same way as subjective values help the individual to 
coördinate the parts of his plan.”19 Because each individual buyer and seller 
in the market will look to match price against their expected utility, 
transactions will only take place if both parties think they will be better off 
for it.  In this way exchanges are guaranteed, in theory, to be Pareto efficient; 
both sides expect to increase their utility as a result of the transaction.20
Because individuals would not contract otherwise, the price will aggregate 
Pareto-efficient transactions and will facilitate the appropriate distribution of 
precious resources.21
This system of voluntary exchange forms the cornerstone of modern 
economic theory.  The ever-familiar graph of supply and demand curves 
illustrates the equilibrium point at which a buyer’s demand for a particular 
15 Id. Money does not have to be commensurable across all values in order for markets to 
work; it only needs to be commensurable within the market.  Incommensurability may mean, 
however, that the particular item of value should not be distributed via a market.  See CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 70 (1997) (arguing that “human goods are not 
commensurable” across the board).
16 Cf. James Gordley, Equality in Exchange, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1587, 1609–12 (1981) 
(discussing the role of “just price” in contractual formation).
17 See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 13 (1962) (stating that there are “two 
ways of co-ordinating the economic activities of millions”—“central direction involving the use of 
coercion” and “voluntary co-operation of individuals—the technique of the market place”).
18 See Eckehard F. Rosenbaum, What Is a Market? On the Methodology of a Contested 
Concept, 58 REV. SOC. ECON. 455, 458 (2000) (developing “a definition that makes it possible to 
identify markets empirically against the background of rival social forms such as firms, central 
planning or occasional exchange transactions”).
19 Hayek, supra note 2, at 526.
20 See Kenneth J. Arrow & Gerard Debreu, Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive 
Economy, 22 ECONOMETRICA 265, 265 (1954) (offering an economic proof of this idea).  However, 
certain conditions—to be discussed in Part I.B—must be met for the market to reach this result.
21 See Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of a Private Property 
Solution, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 533, 540 (2007) (“In our society, we generally answer ‘how much’ 
questions through the free market.  According to standard neoclassical economic theory, by 
aggregating individual preferences through innumerable voluntary exchanges, the ‘invisible hand’ 
of the free market produces economically ‘efficient’ levels of consumer goods and services.”).
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good will intersect with the seller’s supply.22 The maximizing behavior of 
both sellers and buyers will result in a stable equilibrium, if conditions 
hold.23 And this equilibrium results in a maximization of social utility.24
Market equilibrium ensures not only that the appropriate amount of a 
particular resource is produced,25 but also that the good is optimally 
distributed to individuals within that society.26 Under mainstream economic 
principles, markets provide the best method for engaging the productive 
capacity of the nation and distributing the nation’s resources to its 
inhabitants.27
Of course, this is economic theory.  In real life, almost every market 
fails to meet these required conditions for the efficient market hypothesis to 
hold true; these conditions are idealized and are never met in totality.  
Concern over the failure of reality to meet theoretical specifications has 
driven much of the law and economics scholarship of the last half century.  
The Coase Theorem, which initially may seem to counsel that parties will 
always bargain for an efficient result no matter the existing legal rule, is 
actually an explanation of why transaction costs will prevent this from 
happening.28 Even if parties would bargain to reach the best result in a 
frictionless world, the world has a lot of friction.  Coase set out this 
description of transaction costs:
In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is that 
one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on what 
terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to 
undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are 
being observed, and so on.  These operations are often extremely costly, 
sufficiently costly at any rate to prevent many transactions that would be carried 
out in a world in which the pricing system worked without cost.29
These costs can be so significant, thought Coase, that certain transactions are 
removed from the market.  Instead of allocating labor within a firm through 
a market, the firm’s organizational hierarchy assigns the employee to a 
22 ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 11 (3d ed. 2000) (“[T]here is 
no habit of thought so deeply ingrained among economists as the urge to characterize each social 
phenomenon as an equilibrium in the interaction of maximizing actors.”).
23 Id.; see also Sinden, supra note 21, at 541 (“[U]nder perfect conditions, the market will 
reach an equilibrium point of Pareto efficiency—that is, a point at which there is no alternative state 
of affairs that would be a Pareto improvement.”).
24 SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 4, at 160-62. 
 25 Sinden, supra note 21, at 542 (discussing productive efficiency).
26 Id. at 542–43 (discussing allocative efficiency); see also Darren Bush, The “Marketplace 
of Ideas:” Is Judge Posner Chasing Don Quixote’s Windmills?, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1107, 1113 
(2000) (“[T]he perfectly competitive market is said to be allocatively efficient.”).
27 See Bush, supra note 26, at 1114 (“The result of this rational, self-interested behavior is a 
situation in which resources are allocated to their best possible use, goods are produced at their 
lowest possible cost, and innovations diffuse at their fastest possible rate.”).
28 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15–17 (1960).
29 Id. at 15.
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particular set of tasks.  As Coase wrote: “If a workman moves from 
department Y to department X, he does not go because of a change in relative 
prices, but because he is ordered to do so.”30 The choice to manage economic 
choices through a firm or through a market was, for Coase, dependent on 
which choice made more sense when transaction costs were taken into 
account.
Even putting aside these perfect-market assumptions, however, market 
economies have been famously criticized on their own terms.  Basing a 
system of distribution on willingness and ability to pay raises significant 
problem of commensurability, as markets commodify their resources into a 
system of monetary exchange.31 All market systems have some transactions 
which are deemed off-limits—the resources are considered too dangerous 
(as in drugs), too intimate (as in sex), or too valuable to individual life (as in 
organ transplants) to be bought and sold.  Distribution through markets also 
raises concerns about the distribution of wealth, as the rich can pay much 
more for an item than can the poor, regardless of underlying utility, resulting 
in dramatic distortions in distribution.32 Additional critiques include the 
potential for individuals to be mistaken about their actual welfare,33 as well 
as the Marxist view on the inherent class struggle in any capitalist system.34
Whether markets are appropriate mechanisms to distribute resources 
within a society is not a question that this Article intends to address.  Rather, 
assuming an economic system premised to a significant extent on markets, 
we ask: what is the role that negotiation plays within markets?  To do this, 
we look more closely at how markets generally operate to distribute goods, 
services, and other things of value.
B. How Markets Work
The purpose of markets is to distribute things of value among members 
of a society.  Markets are mechanisms to insure the “best” allocation of 
30 R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 387 (1937); see also Coase, supra 
note 28, at 16 (“As I explained many years ago, the firm represents such an alternative to organising 
production through market transactions.”).
31 SUNSTEIN, supra note 15, at 80 (“Incommensurability occurs when the relevant goods 
cannot be aligned along a single metric without doing violence to our considered judgments about 
how these goods are best characterized.”); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 1849, 1851 (1987) (“[T]he characteristic rhetoric of economic analysis is morally wrong 
when it is put forward as the sole discourse of human life.”).
32 See Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 
STAN. L. REV. 387, 425–30 (1981).
33 See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When 
Preferences Are Distorted, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1105, 1105, 1116 (2000); Duncan Kennedy, 
Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to 
Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 575 (1982).
34 Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY (1848), reprinted 
in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 473, 473 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978).
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resources when those resources are scarce and must be divided in some way.  
The most famous metaphor for the market’s work is Adam Smith’s “invisible 
hand.”35 Smith argued that the force behind the hand is individual self-
interest, and that self-interest will lead to market transactions that will make 
society better off.36 The power of Smith’s metaphor is that it conjures a 
benevolent guide for individuals within the economy while at the same time 
providing for individual freedom.
How, exactly, does this invisible hand work?  The genius of markets—
the big, messy, crazy genius—is the myriad of individual, uncoordinated 
transactions that create it.  Even if there seems to be a coherent intelligence 
leading the market to a specific result, markets only truly work if there is the 
absence of such a force.  Each transaction must be made by the individual 
parties on the merits, based on their judgment and circumstances, in order 
for the market to function.37 As Smith acknowledged, the messiness was a 
critical feature: “It is adjusted, however, not by any accurate measure, but by 
the higgling and bargaining of the market, according to that sort of rough 
equality which, though not exact, is sufficient for carrying on the business of 
common life.”38
For this vast gaggle of transactions to agglomerate into a market, we 
need more than simply the transactions themselves.  Looking more 
fundamentally, there must generally be a system of property which allows 
one person or entity to “own” a good or service that can then be sold to 
another.39 If the person has no ownership rights over the thing in question—
say, for example, a private sale of the Brooklyn Bridge—then there could be 
no market distribution of that item.  Relatedly, a market requires that the 
things being exchanged are alienable—transferable from one to another.  If 
an item is inalienable—either through physical impossibility, or the law, or 
overriding social norms—then any purported market will ultimately not 
35 ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 304 (1759) (Liberty Classics 1976) 
(“The rich . . . are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries 
of life which would have been made had the earth been divided into equal portions among all its 
inhabitants; and thus, without intending it, without knowing it, advance the interest of the society, 
and afford means to the multiplication of the species.”).
36 See, e.g., James S. Wrona, False Advertising and Consumer Standing Under Section 43(a) 
of the Lanham Act: Broad Consumer Protection Legislation or a Narrow Pro-Competitive 
Measure?, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 1085, 1093 n.15 (1995) (“Adam Smith’s hypothesis was that the 
laissez-faire approach was the best way of allowing capitalism to prosper and that the theoretical 
‘invisible hand,’ or rather the forces of competition, would guide the marketplace, allowing for 
efficient allocation of resources.”).
37 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 1.2, at 6 (4th ed. 2004) (“Each party to an 
exchange seeks to maximize its own economic advantage on terms tolerable to the other party.”).
38 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 77 (P.F. Collier & Son, 1902) (1776).
39 But see NATHAN B. OMAN, THE DIGNITY OF COMMERCE: MARKETS AND THE MORAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW16 (2016) (arguing that “markets can exist in the absence of 
formal legal rules”).  
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result in lasting transfers.40 If these basics are in place such that one entity 
can provide one thing to another, in exchange for something else of value, 
then a market can be said to exist.
Ownership rights in alienable goods are necessary but not sufficient for 
a functional market.  When we think of markets in our economy, we imagine 
a more robust set of exchanges between a variety of parties in all manner of 
goods, services, property rights, and other things of value.41 In order to 
facilitate those exchanges, markets generally have additional characteristics.  
Markets usually rely on a medium of exchange such as currency to facilitate 
the transaction through the creation of a price.  Market rules are enforced 
through law, social practices, and/or the threat of violence.42 And there is 
some avenue for redress if those rules are broken, either through law or 
private dispute resolution.43
In economic theory, markets operate to provide maximal efficiency in 
the distribution of goods, services, and property rights.  The suppliers in the 
market will meet up and trade with the buyers on the market at the price 
which works best for both parties—the equilibrium price.  This price will
reflect the value that best matches buyers and sellers for that particular good 
at that particular time.  For this equilibrium to occur dependably for every 
transaction, a number of conditions must be met.  Those conditions are 
generally characterized within economics as: both parties are rational actors; 
both parties have perfect information; neither party has significant market 
power; there are no significant and unaccounted-for externalities imposed on 
third parties; and there are no transaction costs.44 If these conditions are met, 
this perfectly competitive market will reach an equilibrium point of Pareto 
efficiency—that is, a point at which there is no alternative state of affairs that 
would make both parties better off.  This, in turn, will lead to overall societal 
efficiency.
No market meets these exacting and theoretical specifications; 
moreover, each specification has spawned a rich academic literature on the 
difficulties caused by the failure of the condition.  Behavioral economics and 
social psychology have challenged the premise that individuals transact on a 
purely rational basis.45 The problem of faulty information flows has been 
40 See Radin, supra note 31, at 1850.
41 FARNSWORTH, supra note 37, § 1.2, at 6 (“In a market economy, the terms of such direct 
bilateral exchanges are arrived at voluntarily by the parties themselves through this process of 
bargaining.”).
42 See OMAN, supra note 39, at 16 (arguing that “markets can exist in the absence of formal 
legal rules”).  But see SUNSTEIN, supra note 15, at 5.
43 OMAN, supra note 39, at 34–35 (noting that extra-legal markets have some mechanism for 
enforcing agreements, even if an extended period of time is necessary).
44 SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 4, at 160.
45 See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to 
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1473 (1998); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, 
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 263 (1979).
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well-documented and studied in a variety of contexts and markets, along with 
potential remedies such as disclosure regimes.46 The field of antitrust is 
centered around the problem of overbearing market power.47 The economic 
literature recognizes negative externalities such as pollution as well as 
positive externalities such as education.48 And transaction costs have been 
central in organizational economics and corporate law, particularly in the 
form of agency costs.49 These imperfections have been fairly well-
chronicled by important scholars in economics, law, and the wider social 
sciences.  While academics have intensively studied various market 
challenges like monopoly power and disparate information, however, 
negotiation has been relatively neglected.
This neglect stems from the underappreciated nature of markets as 
transactions—markets as negotiations.50 Individual transactions form the 
basis for markets.  The relationships between these transactions are what 
move a collection of individual bargains into a market.  One aspect of the 
relationship is competition, which is an integral aspect of markets.  Sellers 
compete with each other for sales, as do buyers; each individual is trying to 
get the best deal while ensuring that the transaction takes place.  The 
resulting jockeying for position leads the market to equilibrium.  Max 
Weber, for example, said: “A market may be said to exist wherever there is 
competition, even if only unilateral, for opportunities of exchange among a 
plurality of potential parties.“51 Weber noted that markets facilitated 
exchange, which required a “compromise of interests [between] the parties,” 
but also highlighted the role that competition—namely, a struggle or 
“haggling” between the parties—plays as well.52
Our paper unearths the role of individual negotiating style, skills, and 
method—what we will label “negotiation effectiveness”—for the law and 
economics literature on transactions.  Just as some markets suffer from 
higher information barriers than others, and other markets are more prone to 
46 George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489 (1970). On the potential remedy of mandated disclosure, see, 
for example, OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW:
THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 1, 10 (2014).
47 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 17, at 14 (noting that monopoly “inhibits effective freedom by 
denying individuals alternatives to the particular exchange”).
48 A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 779–81 (1920); Kenneth J. Arrow, Social 
Responsibility and Economic Efficiency, 21 PUB. POL’Y 303, 303 (1973).
49 ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 68 (1933); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 309 (1976).
50 See OMAN, supra note 39, at 76 (“The economic analysis of law conceptualizes the cost 
of bargaining as a waste of resources to be eliminated whenever possible.  Taken to its logical 
extreme, such a stance is deeply hostile to market processes.”).
51 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 635 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 
Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., Bedminster Press 1968).
52 Id. at 38, 72.
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concentrated power, some markets are more susceptible to the ways in which 
the parties negotiate.  Negotiated transactions are how markets work, and the 
parties’ approaches to negotiation thereby play a role in the market.
Up to this point, only a few scholars have identified this gap in the 
literature.  Saul Levmore and Frank Fagan have noted the absence of 
negotiation analysis in the legal regulation of markets and have proposed 
efforts to reduce its role in most transactions.53 Albert Choi and George 
Triantis consider the role of bargaining power on contract design, offering a 
perspective on how bargaining power intersects with market theory to impact 
contract terms.54 In their analysis, they suggest that bargaining power 
comprises five factors: demand and supply conditions, market concentration, 
private information, patience and risk aversion, and finally, negotiating skills 
and strategy.55 Yet with respect to the negotiation skills, they simply 
conclude that “skills are the subject of many books on negotiation and we do 
not attempt to summarize them here.”56
Structural features of power in negotiation can be undermined and 
frustrated by effective negotiation strategy and tactics, as well as lack 
thereof; features of a negotiation related to skill and ability are distinctly 
different and should be taken seriously by scholars outside the field of 
negotiation.  Before moving more directly into our examination of 
negotiation in markets, we first turn to the role of law in constructing 
markets. 
C. The Construction and Regulation of Markets Through Law
There is a debate among scholars about the role of law in creating 
markets.  In theory, a market can spring up in the absence of law.  Trading 
has taken place in the absence of legal systems for millennia, as there is even 
evidence of the earliest species of humans engaging in exchange.57
However, markets have always depended on some system of understandings, 
53 Levmore & Fagan, supra note 6, at 1471 n.1 (“Economists recognize the waste in search 
costs by consumers, but no one has come to grips with what this means for law.”).
54 Albert Choi & George Triantis, The Effect of Bargaining Power on Contract Design, 98 
VA. L. REV. 1665, 1667 (2012).  
55 Id. at 1675.
56 Id. at 1677.
57 See OMAN, supra note 39, at 24.
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protections, and methods of enforcement.58 Those rules—in our modern 
age—are best characterized as law.59
Law has several constitutive roles in the creation of markets.  Property 
rights endow rights holders with the ability to transact over particular items, 
whether they be goods, services, real estate, or ideas.  The monetary system 
provides a uniform currency for the conduct of trade and for the 
establishment of a common price.  Criminal law and tort law protect property 
rights by outlawing theft, trespass, nuisance, and destruction of property.  
And the law of the transaction is contract law.  
Contracts are defined by the process of exchange.  As defined by the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, “[T]he formation of a contract requires 
a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange 
and a consideration.”60 There is a robust debate within the literature of 
contract law over whether contract theory is rooted in the idea of promise or 
the idea of exchange.61 But the law has not followed the enforcement of 
promises based on moral obligation.62 Instead, contract law remains rooted 
in exchange.63
Contractual bargains are covered by a vast array of cases, statutes, 
regulations, ordinances, and other instantiations of law categorized under the 
broad heading of “contract law.”  The foundational premises for exchange 
are set forth by the common law of contract, carried over from England.64
Common-law contract establishes the legal definition of a contract, which 
58 To take one example from Oman’s book, ancient Carthaginian traders would sail down 
the coast of Africa and lay their goods on beaches for locals to examine.  They would then withdraw 
to their ships.  The Africans would lay ivory and gold next to the items, and then withdraw 
themselves.  If the trade was suitable to the Carthaginians, they would take the offered items and 
leave; if not, they would take back their own items and leave.  Although this trading happened in 
the absence of law, there were obvious methods of enforcement by both parties if one side tried to 
steal the other side’s goods without making a payment.  Id. at 34–35.
59 SUNSTEIN, supra note 15, at 5 (stating that “[f]ree markets depend for their existence on 
law” because law creates private property rights and the rules of contracting). 
60 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1) (AM. L. INST. 1981).
61 Compare CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 1–2 (2d ed. 2015) (rooting contractual 
obligation in the rights of individuals to bind themselves to future courses of action), with O.W. 
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897) (describing the concept of 
efficient breach).
62 See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L.
REV. 708, 709–10 (2007) (“For instance, the moral rules of promise typically require that one keep 
a unilateral promise, even if nothing is received in exchange.  By contrast, contract law only regards 
as enforceable promises that are exchanged for something or on which the promisee has reasonably 
relied to her detriment.”).
63 O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 293–94 (1881) (“The root of the whole matter is 
the relation of reciprocal conventional inducement, each for the other, between consideration and 
promise.”).
64 See RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & IAN AYRES, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 5 (6th ed. 2003) 
(“The mainstream of our law is that which evolved within the English common law tradition, 
encompassing mainly the decisions of common law courts . . . .”).
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requires a bargained-for exchange in which both sides exchange something 
of value.65 The common law also establishes the other rules for contracting: 
the interpretation of agreements,66 the defenses to contractual enforcement,67
and the remedies provided for contractual breach.68 This body of contractual
common law—specific to every state, but shared as a matter of intellectual 
enterprise—governs transactions from beginning to end.
Along with the common law, innumerable other federal, state, and local 
provisions make up the rules of exchange.  Statutory and regulatory 
provisions place additional requirements on market transactions specific to 
certain industries, types of transactions, or characteristics of the parties.  Just 
to provide a few examples: securities regulations have very specific 
provisions regarding the sale of corporate stock;69 drug laws require testing, 
disclosures, and physician prescriptions for medicines and medical 
devices;70 and state and federal licensing prohibits the sales of certain 
services, such as hair cutting and lawyering, without certification of the 
seller’s competency.71 Every possible market, it would seem, has a set of 
legal standards that apply specifically to that market and develop additional 
expectations for the parties that participate in that market.  
The role of law can vary significantly between markets: some are tightly 
regulated, while others have a fairly loose set of legal specifications.  The 
lowest common denominator of law will be the common law of contract, 
unless statutorily erased; the highest common denominator depends on 
overlapping statutory, regulatory, and international regimes.  Obviously, a 
comprehensive canvass across all markets would be impossible.  But as we 
will develop further, the law generally touches on but does not specifically 
address or circumscribe the role of negotiation within most markets.
65 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71(1) (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“To constitute 
consideration, a performance or a return promise must be bargained for.”).
66 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 37, § 7.1, at 413–14 (noting that contract interpretation 
represents a substantial portion of contractual disputes and a significant body of law).
67 See MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS 67 (4th ed. 2001) (“[T]he law has traditionally regarded contracts as void or voidable 
if made by persons lacking legal capacity, including ‘infants’ (generally, persons under [eighteen]), 
drunks and the mentally ill, or if entered into under conditions of duress, or if induced by fraud or 
misrepresentation.”).
68 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 344–77 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
69 See RICHARD W. JENNINGS, HAROLD MARSH, JR., JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & JOEL 
SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 99–110 (8th ed. 1998) (providing overview).
70 See, e.g., PHILIP J. HILTS, PROTECTING AMERICA’S HEALTH: THE FDA, BUSINESS, AND 
ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF REGULATION 239, 270–71 (2003); The History of FDA’s Fight for 
Consumer Protection and Public Health, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/history-fdas-fight-
consumer-protection-and-public-health (last visited Oct. 1, 2020).
71 For a critique of occupational and business licensing, see DICK M. CARPENTER II, LISA 
KNEPPER, ANGELA C. ERICKSON & JOHN K. ROSS, INST. FOR JUST., LICENSE TO WORK: A
NATIONAL STUDY OF BURDENS FROM OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING 6 (2012).
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II. THE THEORY OF NEGOTIATION IN MARKETS
A. Negotiation and the Market
Many commonplace sales of goods and services rely on negotiation: 
most retail car sales and home sales happen after some degree of negotiation 
between the seller and the buyer,72 and many employment contracts are 
negotiated as well.73 Similarly, the individual terms of legal settlements are 
negotiated between lawyers.74 Yet for all of these settings, one can (and 
people often do) speak of market prices.  There is undeniably a housing 
market, a car market, a job market, and even a market for legal claims.  These 
markets are neither monolithic fortresses nor sets of outcomes produced by 
cold, passionless algorithm.  Rather, they are markets that are made up of an 
aggregation of individual, negotiated transactions.  Each of these markets 
has unique features that help to illuminate the chimerical nature of “market 
price,” which may be nothing more than the outcome of the most recent or 
prominent negotiated transaction between similarly situated parties.  
Consider the market price for a house.  If a neighbor recently sold her 
house, and was a terrifically skilled negotiator, should her fantastic outcome 
serve as a benchmark for the next house on the street?  If a neighbor was 
relocated suddenly, should a quick sale at a loss stand as the market price for 
the rest of the block?  Market price in this context may be conceptualized as 
the latest relevant sale, or it might be wiser to consider, as many real estate 
agents do, an average of all recent transactions so that one could arrive at a 
price-per-square-foot figure.75 Nonetheless, even in the latter case, one can 
see that the “market price” is merely an amalgamation of negotiated 
72 Stephen R. Barley, Why the Internet Makes Buying a Car Less Loathsome: How 
Technologies Change Role Relations, 1 ACAD. OF MGMT. DISCOVERIES 5, 10 (2015) (“Whereas 
Americans readily pay the asking price for most goods, they expect to negotiate when purchasing 
a car.”); Yuen Leng Chow, Isa E. Hafalir & Abdullah Yavas, Auction Versus Negotiated Sale: 
Evidence from Real Estate Sales, 43 REAL EST. ECON. 432, 432 (2015) (“[T]he dominant selling
mechanism for real estate is through brokered or negotiated sales.”).
73 Popular books touting skills for job negotiations abound.  See, e.g., PETER J. GOODMAN,
WIN-WIN CAREER NEGOTIATIONS: ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT NEGOTIATING YOUR 
EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT (2001); TERRI R KURTZBERG & CHARLES E. NAQUIN, THE 
ESSENTIALS OF JOB NEGOTIATIONS: PROVEN STRATEGIES FOR GETTING WHAT YOU WANT
(2011).  
74 See, e.g., Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and 
Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1339 (1994). Certainly, not all transactions in 
the marketplace rely on explicit negotiation.  For example, when customers buy products such as 
groceries or gasoline, they are rarely engaged in negotiation.  While there may be negotiation at the 
outside edges of some of these basic consumer transactions, by and large the critical negotiations 
that yield the relevant prices are conducted outside the influence of the everyday customer.  
75 Margaret Heidenry, What Is the Average Price per Square Foot for a Home—and Why 
Does It Matter?, REALTOR.COM (Aug. 21, 2019), https://www.realtor.com/advice/buy/average-
price-per-square-foot-for-a-home/.
HOLLANDER-BLUMOFF & BODIE-SSRN (DO NOT DELETE) 12/15/2020 3:49 PM
202X] D E S K T O P  P U B L I S H I N G  E X A M P L E 115
transactions in the market.  The averaging of the outcomes ought 
theoretically to flatten the effects of any one terrifically skilled or unskilled 
negotiator on either side, unless there is systematic disparity in negotiation 
behavior or expertise by one side or the other.76
Given the interconnections between negotiated outcomes and market 
prices, how do the two groups of scholars consider each other and their 
connection?  Interestingly, the answer is that the groups rarely intersect with 
one another beyond the superficial.  From the negotiation side, markets come 
into play mostly to provide a set of benchmarks for a particular transaction.  
Roger Fisher and William Ury specifically highlight market price as one of 
the suggested possible “objective criteria” in the seminal negotiation book 
Getting to Yes.77 Fisher and Ury suggest that market price can be an 
important tool in being an effective negotiator; one powerful tactic can be to 
rely on market price to provide an external benchmark supporting one’s 
demands.78 Yet when one considers more closely what the idea of a market 
price is, the picture becomes more complex.  If market price dictates
outcome, but past outcome dictates market price, where does that leave the 
current negotiator but at the whim of the past negotiators’ behavior?
Negotiation theorists often connect in this instrumental way to the idea 
of the market—how market price or market features can impact the 
negotiation and an individual’s negotiation strategy—but rarely seem to 
consider the broader implications of negotiations that rely on market pricing.  
Perhaps this is because using market price as an objective criterion is the sole 
way that most negotiation scholars think about markets.  Similarly 
disengaged, in turn, it is the rare market theorist who pauses to consider the 
express role of negotiation behavior on market pricing.79
This is notable because negotiation theory and market theory in some 
ways consider the same situation: what will the end price for a good or 
service be?  In thinking about a particular transaction, market theory suggests 
that rational economic actors will reach some type of equilibrium in pricing.  
This equilibrium will be the market price and it in turn will eliminate much 
of the struggle between both these and future parties over the division of 
surplus.  In contrast, negotiation literature often conceptualizes the 
negotiation process as a struggle over competing reservation prices, which 
are in turn set by potentially vastly different “best alternatives to a negotiated 
76 Some markets are likely to exhibit exactly such a disparity, of course.  Consider the dread 
that many individuals feel when they are faced with a negotiation to buy a car.  This is often because 
of a perception that car salesmen are excellent at employing effective negotiation tactics, while car 
buyers are rarely, on average, as skilled in that area.  The market price for a given car, then, is 
determined by an aggregation of negotiated outcomes where the typical car dealer is more 
negotiation savvy than his buying counterpart.  
77 ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT 
WITHOUT GIVING IN 85, 88–89 (Bruce Patton ed., 1981).
78 Id.
79 See Choi & Triantis, supra note 54, at 1687–88.  
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agreement” (BATNAs) of the negotiating parties.80 Thus, the parties’ 
alternatives dictate reservation prices, which create a zone of possible 
agreement; like two football teams, each negotiator attempts to drive the ball 
down the field towards the other party’s end zone.  The zone of possible 
agreement is a field of surplus, which each party hopes to claim as much of 
as possible.  The BATNAs themselves may depend upon market prices for 
alternative solutions, but the BATNAs typically hold some degree of 
uncertainty involving other factors, such as personal relationship effects and 
considerations of other values that are important to a negotiator, including 
but not limited to fairness, happiness, satisfaction, and effects on others.  
Considering negotiation and market theory together paints a dynamic, 
but also somewhat circular process: indeed, it begins to look like a dog 
chasing its own tail.  The aggregation of individual negotiations drives the 
market price; the market price, in turn, plays a critical role in guiding 
individual negotiation outcomes.  These individual negotiation outcomes—
back to square one—are critical in defining market price.
B. Key Differences between Market Theory Predictions and Negotiated 
Reality
The predominant vision of market exchange, grafted on to the 
negotiation context, suggests that any one bargain between individuals or 
entities will look much like any other bargain between similarly situated 
parties.  That is, the structural components of the situation, being roughly 
equal, will produce similar outcomes across different parties’ interactions.
Negotiation scholars know that this is simply wrong.  Giving the same 
negotiation problem to a variety of different individuals produces an array of 
vastly different results.  These vastly different results cannot be explained by 
information asymmetries.  These differences in result mean that to the extent 
that there is a “market,” one might speak more accurately of a market “array” 
than a market price.81
In real world settings, differences in outcome can be explained by a 
wide range of variables, including information, knowledge, expertise, and 
custom.  Culture, personality, and risk preferences are but a few of the 
potential factors that may change the outcome of similarly situated 
negotiations.  Economic models self-consciously simplify bargaining: as 
John Nash explained, “In general terms, we idealize the bargaining problem 
by assuming that the two individuals are highly rational, that each can 
accurately compare his desires for various things, that they are equal in 
bargaining skill, and that each has full knowledge of the tastes and 
preferences of the other.”82
80 See FISHER & URY, supra note 77, at 97.
81 See supra Part II.A.
82 John F. Nash, Jr., The Bargaining Problem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 155, 155 (1950).
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Economics has moved away from the classic assumption of perfect 
information and is open to the inclusion of information asymmetry as an 
important component of bargaining theory.83 Yet this factor does not include 
negotiating skill, or other factors that systematically affect negotiation 
outcomes, as explicit elements of bargaining theory.  The time is ripe to do 
so now.  Because the market per se is in many cases likely to be an 
amalgamation of innumerable smaller negotiated exchanges, whose 
outcome, each individually, is guided in part if not in whole by negotiation 
behavior and skill, faith in market pricing may be misguided with respect to 
both item or service valuation and applicability to new parties.
Perhaps a key element of this analysis is that market price could refer 
either to a particular previously negotiated outcome or the aggregate of a set 
of all similar negotiations.  Any one individual negotiator who gets a 
uniquely “good” or “bad” deal should not set the market, per se; that outcome 
ought to be only one data point in any definition of the market, taking “the 
market” on its own theoretical terms.84 Anecdotally and empirically, there 
is ample support for the notion that negotiated outcomes will span a wide 
range across the zone of possible agreement.  In data collected by Tyler & 
Hollander-Blumoff (2008),85 for example, outcomes from the same largely 
zero-sum negotiation conducted by over 200 dyads yielded a distribution that 
could largely be plotted in a straight line as follows:
83 See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Games Economists Play, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1821, 
1827 (2000) (noting that “economists have done an excellent job analyzing prisoners' dilemmas--
situations involving information asymmetries, where the models (correctly) predict that it will be 
difficult for participants to coordinate their efforts for mutual benefit”).
84 Individual negotiators face the challenge of demonstrating that their own situation is 
similar to, or distinguishable from, any given prior market negotiation; in this way, the negotiator 
is similar to a litigator evaluating case precedent for its degree of relevance to the case at hand.  
85 Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice in Negotiation: 
Procedural Fairness, Outcome Acceptance, and Integrative Potential, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
473, 478–79 (2008).
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In this negotiation, randomly paired dyads were given the same 
information, by side, and were disputing how much more work a contractor 
would perform on a home project and how much more money the 
homeowner would pay the contractor.  As one can see from the graph, some 
homeowners received a net benefit of approximately $15,000, while at least 
one homeowner suffered a net loss of $15,000 in the same circumstances.  
Similarly, at least one contractor received a net benefit of over $15,000, 
while other contractors suffered a loss of over $10,000.  Again, these 
outcomes all occurred in the face of the same factual and legal setting, with 
the information known by both parties held constant.  The “market” for 
settlement in this case is really a range of possible settlements, all of which 
represent a mutual agreement between parties.  
What this data also helps to illustrate is that similarly situated parties 
will negotiate the same problem very differently, and that outcomes must
reflect differences in negotiation dynamics, including effectiveness and 
skills, because no other variables are systematically different across dyads.  
That is, an application of economic and legal principles to the negotiation 
problem at hand did not produce a unitary outcome; rather, the wide range 
of outcomes present here are not explicable by changes in legal endowments 
or asymmetries of information.  Nor can the range of outcomes be attributed 
purely to chance.  Instead, it is clear that some individuals are simply able to 
negotiate a stronger agreement on behalf of their client, for a variety of 
reasons that will be explored more fully below.
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C.  Negotiation Effectiveness
There is no one definition of a successful negotiator.  Some law and 
economics-based scholars point to information86 and/or bargaining power87
as the driving force in negotiation success, but other factors play a critical 
role in guiding negotiation outcome.  Information and power are appealing 
factors to highlight because they appear, at least on their face, to be 
quantifiable or discernable, while factors around negotiation skill, talent, and 
ability remain frustratingly opaque.
Although there is rarely any question as to whether information is useful 
during negotiation,88 there is an important distinction between having 
information and having negotiation ability.  The relationship is dynamic; it 
is true that very good negotiators often have a great deal of information.  
However, individuals who are good negotiators may engage in preparation 
that includes the actual gathering of information prior to negotiation: that is, 
good negotiators make it their business to seek out relevant information 
before entering into negotiation.89 Part of what makes them effective is that 
they build up information, perhaps even to the point of information 
asymmetry.  This asymmetry is not inherent or inevitable to the role.  During 
the negotiation process, good negotiators will use information strategically, 
as well as continuing to gather information throughout the negotiation.  But 
again, information itself, per se, cannot fully account for the observed 
differences in negotiation outcomes among parties that are similarly situated, 
a result often found in negotiation studies where parties are given the same 
consistent information by side.90
Another potential source of negotiation effectiveness is bargaining 
power.  As noted above, Choi and Triantis, considering the role of such 
power in the design of contracts, suggest that bargaining power can be 
86 See Choi & Triantis, supra note 54, at 1701–12.
87 See Russell Korobkin, On Bargaining Power, in THE NEGOTIATOR’S FIELDBOOK 251–56
(Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Christopher Honeyman eds., 2006).
88 There are, of course, unique circumstances in which ignorance can be helpful to one’s 
side.  For example, in an anecdote described by Schelling, one downed airman can gain the upper 
hand over another downed airman in negotiations over which man should attempt to traverse 
dangerous terrain to find the other, simply by transmitting his own location and then destroying his 
radio.  His ignorance of the other airman’s position, coupled with the other airman’s awareness of 
such ignorance, actually helps him to achieve his aim of forcing the other man to come to him.  
Similarly, complete ignorance about a particular topic may allow a negotiator to ask for something 
in apparent good faith that is completely outside the bounds of reason or possibility, and she may 
gain an advantage through doing so.  Just as easily, however, she may signal a lack of credibility 
or suggest that there is no potential zone of possible agreement between the parties and this may 
prevent any negotiated outcome. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 58–59
(1980).
89 See Clifford Geertz, The Bazaar Economy: Information and Search in Peasant Marketing, 
68 AM. ECON. REV. 28, 29–30 (1978).
90 See supra text accompanying notes 84–85. 
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broken down into five factors: demand and supply conditions, market 
concentration, private information, patience and risk aversion, and finally, 
negotiating skills and strategy.91 Note that here, Choi and Triantis subsume 
the possession of useful information into a broader category of power.92 And 
Choi and Triantis do suggest that bargaining power contains at least one 
element that depends upon the unique behavior of the individual negotiator.93
Without good negotiation skills and strategy, they imply, structural power 
on paper might go begging.94
Russell Korobkin has posited, more simply, that one’s BATNA is what 
dictates who has power during a negotiation.95 However, Korobkin quickly 
clarifies that what is really meaningful in such a setting is perceptions of 
one’s own and others’ BATNAs, and a key feature of such perception is 
one’s ability to persuade and influence another party into believing that your 
BATNA is what you say it is.  Thus, it is not “absolute” power that is 
meaningful; it is perceptions of power that are critical in determining how 
negotiation unfolds.96 Thus, Korobkin concludes, power is derived from 
persuasive behavior: in other words, negotiation skill.97 What both Korobkin 
and Choi and Triantis note, but in varying degrees of foregrounding, is that 
so-called structural features of negotiation such as information and power 
are only useful to the degree that the negotiator makes them useful.  That is, 
an individual’s negotiation behavior—their negotiation acumen and talent—
is a significant driver of both information acquisition and negotiation power 
and, therefore, of negotiation outcome.  
One consideration as we contemplate what factors make individuals 
successful negotiators is how to define success in negotiation at all.  There 
are many critical components to a successful negotiation.  Economic 
outcome is, of course, one of the paramount goals, but other important goals 
may include durability of an agreement, satisfaction with nonmonetary 
terms, a belief in the distributive justice (outcome fairness) of the agreement, 
and subjective versus objective value.98 Research has also suggested that 
people care about being treated fairly during the negotiation process.99 The 
task of defining a good outcome is not an easy one, but for our purposes here 
91 See Choi & Triantis, supra note 54, at 1675.
92 Id.
93 See id. at 1676–77.
94 See Choi & Triantis, supra note 54.
95 See Korobkin, supra note 87, at 252–53. 
96 Id. at 253–54. 
97 See id. at 251–52. 
98 Jared R. Curhan, Hillary Anger Elfenbein & Gavin J. Kilduff, Getting Off on the Right 
Foot: Subjective Value Versus Economic Value in Predicting Longitudinal Job Outcomes from Job 
Offer Negotiations, 94 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 524, 529 (2009); Jared R. Curhan, Hillary Anger 
Elfenbein & Noah Eisenkraft, The Objective Value of Subjective Value: A Multi-Round Negotiation 
Study, 40 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 690, 703–05 (2010).
99 See Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, supra note 85, at 473.
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we too will necessarily simplify: we largely interpret good outcome to mean 
the highest economic benefit.
What factors might be included in negotiation ability?  Our purpose 
here is not to offer a dispositive portrait of the skilled negotiator, but rather 
to gather in one place, briefly, some of the potential factors that can lead a 
negotiator to better outcomes than others.  The factors that form the array of 
effective negotiation behavior are wide-ranging and complex.  Beyond 
simply considering information and power, negotiation scholars and teachers 
use analytical frameworks that include styles, strategy, tactics, and skills.  
Subsumed within these frameworks are considerations that include but are 
not limited to: deception, communication, awareness and use of one’s own 
and others’ cognitive biases, awareness of integrative versus distributive 
potential, an understanding of relationships, listening skills, awareness and 
navigation of cultural issues, emotional intelligence, perspective-taking, and 
dealing with difficult people or tactics.  
The question of what makes a negotiator effective is complicated, 
beginning with the most fundamental question of conceptualization of the 
process.  The negotiation literature is divided between those who believe the 
most successful negotiators are sharp, tough, competitive, and often without 
scruples, and those who believe in a collaborative, “principled,” or problem-
solving approach to negotiation.  The debate between these camps is more 
theoretical than empirical, with legions of “how-to” books, articles, and 
courses advocating for variants of these approaches.100 Often, assertions 
about negotiation effectiveness have grounding in the anecdotal or the 
“common-sensical” voice of the author, without reference to data or 
research.101
Ironically, negotiation processes are also simultaneously among the 
most studied of psychological interactions, so no shortage of data exists 
about negotiation behavior and its effects.102 However, because the scope of 
negotiation behavior is so very broad—a field that can include nuclear 
disarmament, small claims settlement, salary determination, and where to eat 
dinner is by definition highly variegated—the mixed signals and vast scope 
of the data can be daunting to distill into simple messages.  A review of the 
literature suggests that effective negotiation behavior’s antecedents can be 
tied to at least four large clusters: strategy and tactics, individual differences, 
training, and external bias.
100 Books Received, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1099, 1099 (reviewing ROGER FISHER,
ELIZABETH KOPELMAN & ANDREA KUPFER SCHNEIDER, BEYOND MACHIAVELLI: TOOLS FOR 
COPING WITH CONFLICT (1994)).
101 See e.g., Barbara L. Rosenfeld, Negotiating Tips from a Master, L.A. LAW., May 
2007, at 52, 52; Donald C. Farber, Common-Sense Negotiation, 73 A.B.A. J. 92, 92–93 
(August 1987).
102 See generally Leigh L. Thompson, Jiunwen Wang & Brian C. Gunia, Negotiation, 61 
ANN. REV. PSYCH. 491 (2010). 
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1. Strategy and Tactics
In the broadest terms, negotiation strategy is often conceptualized as 
either competitive or cooperative, distributive or integrative, positional or 
principled, and so on, with the former of each of these viewing negotiation 
as a more hostile battle for resources in which a gain for one party yields a 
loss for the other, and the latter of each of these focusing more on shared 
interests and expansion of the so-called negotiation “pie.”103 Of course, 
strategies may also be a mix between these approaches.  Because negotiation 
is a dynamic and highly contextual process, choosing which approach to 
employ in any particular engagement is important to negotiation success.
Tactics include the specific behaviors that one chooses to use to 
implement one’s strategies.  Tactics can include processes and decisions as 
diverse as truth telling versus falsity, social value orientation, perspective 
taking and empathy, opening offers, the use of psychological heuristics and 
biases, particular use of communication, and nonverbal behaviors, just to 
name a few.  
A host of particular tactics and behaviors has been tested in the 
negotiation context to determine whether certain behaviors are more or less 
effective in yielding better negotiation outcomes.  Studies have used 
experimental manipulations to determine how inducing certain mindsets or 
behaviors affect negotiation outcome.104 Findings are varied and provide an 
almost kaleidoscopic perspective on what makes a negotiator effective.  For 
example, individuals may be more or less skilled at revealing or concealing 
information, or at eliciting accurate information from the other side, as 
discussed earlier.105 But individuals may also begin with different opening 
positions or offers that are more or less beneficial to their side.  They may be 
better or worse communicators, or more skilled in the art of persuading 
others to see their side.106 They may engage in nonverbal or verbal behavior 
that promotes liking by the other side, which can be beneficial to the ultimate 
outcome.107 They may be particularly skilled in persuading others to use an 
integrative rather than a distributive bargaining structure, or vice versa.  In 
addition, some negotiators may be able to employ lessons from social 
103 See generally Willem F.G. Mastenbrook, Negotiation: A Conceptual Model, 5 GRP.
& ORG. STUDS. 324 (1980).  
104 See discussion infra Section C.4. 
105 See discussion infra Section C.
106 For example, one study found that negotiators do better when they use language that is 
less extreme in making requests.  See generally Yossi Maaravi, Orly Idan & Guy Hochman, And 
Sympathy is What We Need My Friend—Polite Requests Improve Negotiation Results, 14 PLOS
ONE 1 (2019).
107 Jennifer S. Mueller & Jared R.Curhan, Emotional Intelligence and Counterpart Mood 
Induction in a Negotiation, 17 INT’L J. CONFLICT MGMT. 110, 122 (2006); Daniel Druckman & 
Benjamin J. Broome, Value Differences and Conflict Resolution: Familiarity or Liking?, 35 J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 571, 591 (1991).
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psychology on decision-making heuristics and biases to benefit from 
exploiting phenomena including anchoring, framing, overconfidence, and 
more, while other negotiators may suffer pitfalls from these same features of 
negotiation.108
2. Individual Differences
The role of individual differences, rather than specific behavior, has 
been controversial in the negotiation field. Some believe that individual 
differences are not systematically related to outcome differences in 
negotiation, and others have long repeated this conclusion.109 And, as with 
all negotiation processes, the dynamic nature of the interaction adds a layer 
of complexity on top of what individual difference factors will or will not 
lead to effective negotiation, because at least two people’s individual 
differences are involved.  
Nonetheless, more recent research has begun to challenge the paradigm 
that individual differences don’t matter.  One meta-analysis, for example, 
found that individual level variables including cognitive and emotional 
intelligence had significant effects on negotiation outcome, and all of the 
“Big Five” personality variables with the exception of conscientiousness had 
a significant effect on noneconomic negotiation variables.110 The extent to 
which these characteristics are immutable across situations versus subject to 
variation with a particular situation may also affect the way that these 
differences play out in particular negotiations; negotiation counterparts who 
can manipulate certain personality dimensions to their own ends may be 
more successful than others who are relatively uninterested in those 
dimensions or less adept at navigating or shaping them.  
Another individual-level difference variable that may influence 
negotiation outcome is social value orientation (SVO).  Social value 
orientation describes the baseline orientation of an individual towards the 
allocation of resources.111 Social value orientation may be proself or 
prosocial, with social science meta-analyses suggesting that the population 
108 Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Heuristics and Biases at the Bargaining Table, 87 
MARQ. L. REV. 795, 797–98 (2004).
109 Hillary Anger Elfenbein, Jared R. Curhan, Noah Eisenkraft, Aiwa Shirako & Lucio 
Baccaro, Are Some Negotiators Better than Others? Individual Differences in Bargaining 
Outcomes, 42 J. RSCH. IN PERSONALITY 1463, 1463–64 (2008).
110 See Sudeep Sharma, William P. Bottom & Hillary Anger Elfenbein, On the Role of 
Personality, Cognitive Ability, and Emotional Intelligence in Predicting Negotiation Outcomes: A 
Meta-Analysis, 3 ORG. PSYCH. REV. 293, 293 (2013).  For additional empirical results, see 
generally Sudeep Sharma, Hillary Anger Elfenbein, Jeff Foster & William P. Bottom, Predicting 
Negotiation Performance from Personality Traits: A Field Study across Multiple Occupations, 31
HUM. PERFORMANCE 145 (2018).
111 For a more detailed overview of research on social value orientation, see Rebecca 
Hollander-Blumoff, Social Value Orientation and the Law, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 475, 475 
(2017).
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is roughly split between preference for outcomes that are proself (either 
competitive, meaning that individuals want to “win” in their interactions 
with others, or individualistic, meaning that they have a desire for the highest 
outcome possible for themselves, without reference to the other party’s 
results) or prosocial (with a strong desire to divide resources equally, and 
also perhaps to expand the “pie” as much as possible).112 Although 
psychologists sometimes refer to SVO as a personality variable, it is a 
personality variable that is highly affected by social cues.113 Thus, context 
can lead individuals to act more in accordance with one SVO than another, 
depending on the message sent by that context.114 A good negotiator, then, 
may be able to shape the other party’s SVO through cues and messaging in 
a way that benefits her own outcome.  A good negotiator may also be able to 
choose her own most beneficial SVO and resist external efforts to change 
it.115
Yet another individual-level difference relates to consideration of 
distributive fairness in negotiation.  As decades of research on the ultimatum 
game has shown, some individuals will routinely reject outcomes that are 
economically favorable to them if those outcomes do not comport with 
fairness norms, while other individuals will not.116 This is particularly 
important for two reasons.  First, it suggests that good negotiators should 
learn about the other side’s fairness preferences, because if you are 
negotiating with someone who is willing to take any economically beneficial 
outcome regardless of fairness, you can set your sights much higher (or 
lower, as the case may be) than you might otherwise be able to.117 Second, 
112 Id. at 589, 491.
113 Id. at 494.
114 For example, in one study, individuals playing a prisoner’s dilemma game were more 
cooperative when told that the game was called the Community Game, and more competitive when 
told that the game was called the Wall Street Game, even though the actual rules of the game were 
identical.  Varda Liberman, Steven M. Samuels & Lee Ross, The Name of the Game: Predictive 
Power of Reputations Versus Situational Labels in Determining Prisoner’s Dilemma Game Moves, 
30 PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1175, 1178, 1182 (2004).
115 For example, a negotiator who can persuade her opponent to be prosocial—to believe that 
an even distribution of resources is appropriate—may be effective in gaining more than she might 
otherwise, but a negotiator who chooses to be individualistic in the face of efforts to change frame 
may be able to claim more of the surplus for herself.  Of course, these scenarios are highly context
dependent.  
116 Werner Güth, Rolf Schmittberger & Bernd Schwarze, An Experimental Analysis of 
Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 367, 383–84 (1982); Martin A. Nowak, Karen 
M. Page & Karl Sigmund, Fairness Versus Reason in the Ultimatum Game, 289 SCIENCE 1773, 
1773 (2000) (noting that the ultimatum game “has inspired dozens of theoretical and experimental 
investigations”); Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Ultimatum Game, 2 J. ECON. PERSPS. 195, 
205 (1988).
117 Interestingly, this kind of negotiation effectiveness relates to information acquisition—but 
it is a different kind of information acquisition than contemplated by economists and legal scholars, 
relating not to substantive information about the subject matter of the negotiation but instead to the 
specific characteristics of the other parties to the negotiation.  
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negotiators who can shape other people’s perceptions of fairness, and 
persuade others that their proposed outcome provides the level of fairness 
that is desired, will be able to enjoy more success at the negotiation table.  
In addition, procedural fairness (procedural justice) has also been found 
to influence perceptions about negotiation outcome, with individuals who 
believe they have received a negotiated outcome through a fair process 
perceiving those outcomes as more likely to lead to a durable agreement.118
Thus, individuals differences in sensitivity to process fairness may also play 
a role in providing individual-level variation in willingness to agree to 
certain outcomes.  In addition, negotiators who can master the art of ensuring 
that their negotiation counterparts feel that the process is fair may have an 
advantage in negotiating successfully.  
Some research has found that negotiators receive better results when 
they have a choice mindset—that is, they focus more on the idea that 
individuals face choices rather than constraints.119 Although this study 
manipulated individuals’ frame of mind, in the real world of negotiation, 
whether someone approaches a negotiation with the belief that they are 
constrained or not may rest on underlying individual differences as well.
Finally, although it is not an individual-level difference, cultural 
differences in negotiation style may play a role in guiding the outcome of 
negotiations.120 Although documenting the vast effects of cultural 
differences is outside the scope of this project, it is worth noting that those 
who are better able to navigate their own and others’ cultural identity at the 
negotiation table will gain a benefit.  
3. Training
While some more essential individual differences are related to 
negotiation performance, evidence also suggests that negotiation is a skill 
that can be taught.  Indeed, some negotiation training specifically targets for 
growth and development particular individual differences that have been 
linked to good outcomes.  For example, emotional intelligence can, to some 
degree, be improved through effort.121 Other negotiation training focuses on 
teaching the kinds of strategies and tactics that have been found effective in 
118 Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, supra note 85, at 493–94.
119 Anyi Ma, Yu Yang & Krishna Savani, “Take It or Leave It!” A Choice Mindset Leads to 
Greater Persistence and Better Outcomes in Negotiations, 153 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 1, 11 (2019) (individuals who were induced to focus on choices rather than 
constraints perceived greater room to negotiate, demonstrated more persistence in the face of 
ultimatums, and received better outcomes in negotiation).
120 See, e.g., Michael W. Morris & Michele J. Gelfand, Cultural Differences and Cognitive 
Dynamics, in THE HANDBOOK OF NEGOTIATION AND CULTURE 45–54 (Michele J. Gelfand & 
Jeanne M. Brett eds. 2004).
121 JAMIL ZAKI, THE WAR FOR KINDNESS: BUILDING EMPATHY IN A FRACTURED WORLD 15,
27–32 (2019).
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social science research, or focuses on sharing the insights about human 
behavior, especially decision-making behavior, to individuals who could use 
that information to their benefit in negotiation.122
There is significant debate over what best practices in negotiation 
training are, with respect to both content and pedagogy.  For example, some 
negotiation teachers focus on teaching a more win-lose style of 
negotiation.123 Others adopt a stance geared towards more collaborative or 
principled type of negotiation.124 A debate has long existed between these 
negotiation teaching “camps.”125
Different kinds of learning processes have also been studied.  
Individuals can improve negotiation performance through a variety of types 
of training, including analogy and observation.126 Of particular interest, 
those who believe that negotiation is a skill that can be deepened are more 
likely to do better in negotiation than those who believe negotiation is an 
innate ability.127 In any event, negotiation effectiveness can be bolstered by 
access to and participation in training programs.  
4. External bias
In addition, perhaps critically relevant to law, research suggests that 
beyond the issue of individual negotiation “skill,” negotiations may unfold 
differently depending on the identity of the parties.  That is to say, issues of 
systemic or individual bias may play a significant role in shaping outcomes, 
regardless of skill or ability of the negotiator, thereby affecting and inhibiting 
or amplifying some negotiators’ capacity for effectiveness.  For example, 
when women and minorities systematically receive lower initial offers from 
122 See supra note 110.
123 See, e.g., James J. White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in 
Negotiation, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RSCH. J. 926, 926–27 (describing negotiation as a mostly zero-
sum proposition in which lying and manipulation are the order of the day).
124 FISHER & URY., supra note 77, at 86–88; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View 
of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 784–85 (1984).
125 Although the principled, collaborative, problem-solving approach promulgated by Fisher, 
Ury, Menkel-Meadow, and others, see supra notes 77, 123–24, has come to be dominant in 
academic settings, that ascendancy has been rattled and challenged by the popularity and recent 
victories by Donald Trump.  See G. Richard Shell, Transactional Man: Teaching Negotiation 
Strategy in the Age of Trump, 35 NEGOT. J. 31, 32–33 (2019) (reviewing MARTIN E. LATZ, THE 
REAL TRUMP DEAL: AN EYE-OPENING LOOK AT HOW HE REALLY NEGOTIATES (2018)).
126 Janice Nadler, Leigh Thompson & Leaf Van Boven, Learning Negotiation Skills: Four 
Models of Knowledge Creation and Transfer, 49 MGMT SCI. 529, 530 (2003); Jeffrey Loewenstein 
& Leigh L. Thompson, Learning to Negotiate: Novice and Experienced Negotiators, in
NEGOTIATION THEORY AND RESEARCH 77, 77 (Leigh L. Thompson ed., 2006); Elizabeth Chapman, 
Edward W. Miles & Todd Maurer, A Proposed Model for Effective Negotiation Skill Development, 
36 J. MGMT. DEV. 940, 941 (2017).
127 Laura J. Kray & Michael P. Haselhuhn, Implicit Negotiation Beliefs and Performance: 
Experimental and Longitudinal Evidence, 93 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 49, 50 (2007).
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their negotiation counterparts, when women face negative consequences 
after negotiating, and when some individuals choose not to negotiate in order 
to maintain positive relationships, it becomes clear that systematic biases 
may creep (or march) into the market system by way of negotiated 
transactions.  
Research from Pew found a significant wage gap in 2015 among college 
graduates with different demographic identities.128 For example, college-
educated African American and Hispanic men, as well as white and Asian 
college-educated women, earned roughly 80% of what their white male 
counterparts earned.129 African American and Hispanic women earned about 
70% of the white male wage.130 While not all of the gaps may be attributed 
to negotiation behavior, the gaps do point out an immediate concern with 
market price—there appears to be a different “market price” for different 
groups.  This differential outcome may, though, also stem from significant 
differences in negotiation behavior on the part of negotiating pairs.  
For example, in 1995, Ian Ayres and Peter Siegelman sent individuals 
into car dealerships to assess whether men and women and white and African 
American individuals would be presented with different opening offers for 
their purchase of the same car.131 For the initial offers, the range of profit 
that would accrue to the dealer varied widely depending on the sex and race 
of the purported purchaser.132 The salesmen gave white men an offer that, 
on average, would provide $1,019 in profit to the dealer, while white women 
received an offer that provided $1,127 in profit to the dealer.133 In contrast, 
offers to African American purchasers provided $1,337 (women) and $1,954 
(men) profit to the dealer.134 Thus, the range of the opening offer for this 
car, representing the range of opening offers on the market, varied by $935—
a not inconsiderable amount that represents a 92% increase in profit for 
dealers.135
Of course, these are just opening offers, and represent only one side of 
the negotiation.  However, not only does literature suggest the power of 
opening offers during negotiation,136 but the Ayres and Siegelman study 
itself explores this question.  Even though all participants in the study 
128 Eileen Patten, Racial, Gender Wage Gaps Persist in U.S. Despite Some Progress, PEW 
RSCH. CTR. (July 1, 2016), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/01/racial-gender-
wage-gaps-persist-in-u-s-despite-some-progress/.
129 Id.
130 Asian men earned slightly more than white men.  Id.
131 See Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, Race and Gender Discrimination in Bargaining for a 
New Car, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 304, 305–07 (1995).




136 Adam D. Galinsky & Thomas Mussweiler, First Offers as Anchors: The Role of 
Perspective-Taking and Negotiator Focus, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 657, 657–58 (2001).
HOLLANDER-BLUMOFF & BODIE-SSRN (DO NOT DELETE) 12/15/2020 3:49 PM
128 N O T R E  D A M E  L A W  R E V I E W [VOL. XX:N
followed a common script, the final offers by the dealer span an even greater 
range: final offers received by white men (profit to dealer of $564) were far 
lower than final offers received by African American men ($1,665).137
African American men’s offers represented a profit for dealers 200 percent 
higher than for the offers those dealers gave to white men.  While these 
findings do not address negotiation skill per se, because the study 
participants were sent in with identical scripts, they do suggest that certain 
groups may have a more difficult hurdle to overcome in negotiation, 
regardless of their negotiation abilities.  
In another notable study, Linda Babcock and Sara Laschever traced a 
large part of the disparities in salaries between men and women to the 
markedly higher tendency among men to negotiate starting salary offers.138
This is yet another way that negotiable transactions may have vastly different 
results; part of the skill set of a talented negotiator is knowing when there is 
a potential for increasing the value of a transaction through negotiating.  
Babcock and others’139 work suggests that there is a threshold question about 
outcomes to consider when thinking about market pricing: has the 
transaction been negotiated, or not?  The nonnegotiated market price and the 
negotiated market price may differ meaningfully.  
When a so-called negotiation skill—knowing when there is a possibility 
of increasing one’s outcome through negotiation—is distributed unevenly 
and systematically across populations, this may suggest a problematic 
feature of market pricing.  But even more troubling, some empirical research 
has suggested that women’s “failure to negotiate” may not reflect a lack of 
negotiation skill at all.  Instead, this research has suggested that women who 
do negotiate may face a backlash effect, rendering a decision not to negotiate 
more explicable and perhaps more economically understandable in the long-
term.  Some research has found that women who engaged in a salary 
negotiation were rated as be more unlikable than nonnegotiators, and that 
their negotiation counterparts were more likely to say that they would not 
want to work with them in the future.140 Thus, the “failure to negotiate” may 
actually reflect a rational and considered decision by women in some 
situations; nonetheless, lack of negotiation results in a lower market price for 
women in the workplace.  This provides women in salary negotiations with 
a set of lose-lose options in terms of “skill” in negotiation. 
137 Ayres & Siegelman, supra note 131, at 308. 
138 LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON’T ASK: NEGOTIATION AND THE 
GENDER DIVIDE 1–3 (2003). 
139 See id.; see also Andreas Leibbrandt & John A. List, Do Women Avoid Salary 
Negotiations? Evidence from a Large-Scale Natural Field Experiment, 61 MGMT. SCI. 2016, 2017 
(2015); Hannah Riley Bowles, Linda Babcock & Lei Lai, Social Incentives for Gender Differences 
in the Propensity to Initiate Negotiations: Sometimes It Does Hurt to Ask, 103 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 84, 89–91 (2007).
140 See Bowles et al., supra note 139, at 89–91.
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In addition, the dynamic nature of negotiation means that even skilled 
negotiators’ outcomes may differ because of the behavior of their negotiation 
counterpart.  Recent research indicated that women who negotiated with men 
holding stronger stereotype beliefs regarding gender did worse in negotiation
than women who negotiated with men who did not hold, or held less 
strongly, such beliefs.141
Another recent study considered the role of race in salary negotiation, 
seeking to explore reasons for the racial wage gap.142 The study posits that 
stereotypes about African Americans help to create a backlash effect for job 
seekers who do engage in negotiation.  The researchers specifically invoke 
“the market,” hypothesizing that job evaluators who are more racially biased 
“will hold expectancies consistent with racial stereotypes that consign Black 
job seekers to lower estimations of market value (i.e., starting salary) and 
therefore, perceive them as less likely to negotiate.”143 The researchers 
further hypothesize that when African Americans do negotiate, they will 
encounter negative results because, “[a]lthough there is generally nothing 
negative about negotiating one’s salary, the application of a prescriptive 
stereotype to Black negotiators (i.e., they do not deserve to negotiate for 
higher salaries) can produce negative salary outcomes when these 
individuals do not conform.”144 Participants who had less explicit bias 
believed that the white and African American negotiators negotiated about 
the same amount.145 In addition, the study found that an increase in 
negotiation behavior by an African American negotiator corresponded to a 
decrease in ultimate salary: African Americans were penalized for 
negotiating.146
Research including the studies discussed above, taken together, suggest 
several important features of the market.  First, the market is not fully 
dictated by legal endowments, a paradigm that has been popular among law 
and economics scholars for decades.147 Additionally, markets are not fully 
dictated by limits on information or available information; in these settings 
described above, all parties were privy to the same information.  Finally, 
markets are not fully dictated by structural elements of power, such as the 
inherent power of being a seller or a buyer, or employee or employer, in a 
141 Vaani Pardal, Madeliene Alger & Ioana Latu, Implicit and Explicit Gender Stereotypes at 
the Bargaining Table: Male Counterparts’ Stereotypes Predict Women’s Lower Performance in 
Dyadic Face-to-Face Negotiations, 83 SEX ROLES: 289, 289, 301 (2020).
142 Morela Hernandez, Derek R. Avery, Sabrina D. Volpone & Cheryl R. Kaiser, Bargaining 
While Black: The Role of Race in Salary Negotiations, 104 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 581, 581 (2019).
143 Id. at 582.
144 Id. at 583.
145 Id. at 585.
146 Id. at 587.
147 The idea that legal endowments are critical in dictating the course of a negotiation is 
highlighted in Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The 
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968–69 (1979), and in numerous articles that followed.  
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given setting.  Because this range of outcomes represents what happens in a 
given setting, this highlights, again, that “market price” must be 
conceptualized as a range or set of outcomes that may vary widely on the 
individual level.
These differences in market price even within conceptually unified 
markets suggest that including negotiating effectiveness in market 
parameters will help to capture some of this variation.  In considering how 
much weight to place on the role of negotiation effectiveness, it would be 
useful to understand what markets have high and what markets have low 
negotiation variability; as noted above, the market for buying bread at the 
grocery store is likely to have low variability, but the market for cars appears 
to have fairly high variability.  An examination of the role that negotiating 
skill and effectiveness may occupy in determining outcomes suggests that 
the law may play a critical role in addressing inequalities, going beyond 
simply information deficits and traditional conceptions of structural power.  
III. NEGOTIATION VARIANCE WITHIN MARKETS
Now that we have identified the “variable” of negotiation skill and 
ability, how should we apply this variable in our study and regulation of 
markets?  Markets are not uniformly sensitive to negotiation.  Some markets 
will have little to no negotiation within them, while others will be very 
sensitive to fluctuations based on negotiating ability.148 The importance of 
negotiation to a particular market varies based on many factors.  The follow 
is an effort to create a taxonomy of negotiation variance within markets, 
based on work in law, sociology, and economics, that can be used as an initial 
guide to variance.149 We focus on: (a) the characteristics of the transaction 
subject; (b) the structure of the market; and (c) the norms of the market.
A. Characteristics of the Transaction Subject
The “transaction subject” is the item which is being bought and sold in 
the market, whether it be a good, a service, real property, intellectual 
property, legal rights, or some combination thereto.  The nature of the subject 
of the transaction will influence whether there is room for negotiation over 
the terms of the deal.  Perhaps the most obvious factor is the uniqueness of 
the item.  The more unique, rare, or uncommon the item is, the more likely 
148 See Peter Martin Jaworski & Jason Brennan, Market Architecture: It’s the How, Not the 
What, 13 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 231, 232 (2015) (“Some markets have a fixed price, like at your 
local Walmart.  Other markets have prices that you are expected to haggle over, like at a garage 
sale.”).
149 Our breakdown of transaction characteristics, structure of the market, and norms of the 
market, is based on Patrik Aspers’ three prerequisites for an ordered market: (1) what the market is 
about, (2) how things are done in the market, and (3) determining the economic worth of the offer.  
PATRIK ASPERS, MARKETS 92–100 (Polity Press 2011).
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there will be difficulty in precisely pricing it.  Because markets first turn to 
comparator sales to form a basis of market price, the absence of relatively 
similar comparators will leave the parties looking to second-order principles 
in pricing.  These subsidiary aspects of the item—its cost, the sum of value 
for its individual components, or its value to the buyer—are less 
determinable or less known to both parties, and therefore make the 
transaction more negotiable.
Relatedly, the “elasticity” of a particular market will affect 
negotiability.  Elasticity—or more specifically, the price elasticity of 
demand—refers to the extent to which the quantity of a particular transaction 
subject demanded by buyers responds to a price change.150 The following 
factors are thought to determine the elasticity of demand: the importance of 
the item to the buyer, whether the item is a necessity or luxury, whether there 
are adequate substitutes for the item, and whether a buyer can switch into 
another category item, and how quickly.151 A medical drug that is necessary 
for the buyer’s continued survival and that has no substitute would be 
inelastic as to that buyer.152 On such an item, the buyer is likely to pay very 
high amounts—in this case, all of their discretionary income beyond the 
other needs for survival—to obtain the item.  As a result, the seller has 
significant negotiation power.  Similar inelasticity may arise in situations 
where common but necessary goods have experienced a supply shock—say, 
potable water in the aftermath of a natural disaster.  In such cases, sellers 
have temporary but extraordinary negotiation power as these items will be 
in extremely high demand, and there is because of the circumstances a 
severely constricted (or nonexistent) set of alternatives.153
Along these lines, sociologist Patrik Aspers has drawn a distinction 
between standard markets and status markets.154 In standard markets, the 
item itself can stand separate and apart from the individual identities of the 
sellers and buyers; most markets for fungible goods or raw materials would 
fall into this category.155 Status markets, on the other hand, are ranked by 
the status of their participants, such that the more elite producers can demand 
more for their products.156 Goods such as designer-label clothing, while 
commodities to some extent, fall within status markets because buyers take 
the status of the seller into account when making the purchase.  Standard 
markets are likely to have lower negotiation variance, as their sale items must
on some level be fungible between participants, leading to lower variance 
150 SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 4, at 65-66, 671.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 See, e.g., Gregory R. Kirsch, Hurricanes and Windfalls: Takings and Price Controls in 
Emergencies, 79 VA. L. REV. 1235, 1235–38 (1993).
154 ASPERS, supra note 149, at 88.
155 Id. at 89.
156 Id. at 88–89.
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between contractual sales.  Because status markets take identity and social 
station into account, their value is harder to quantify and thus leaves open 
more room for variance as to terms.
The quality and quantity of information available about the item also 
influences its negotiability.  Akerlof’s “market for lemons” illustrates the 
instability of a market with highly variable quality along with poor 
information as to that quality.157 Negotiation skills can fill the gap in 
information with persuasion, guile, and even irrelevant or misleading 
entreaties, as long as it does not cross the line into misrepresentation.  The 
nature of the available information matters as well, as quantifiability of 
quality reduces the role of negotiation.  If the item being sold can be valued 
according to a specific metric, such as carats for diamonds or karats for gold, 
prices can sort themselves along the metric with less need for bargaining.  
There are also quantifiable metrics that are based on qualitative assessments: 
for example, the Tomatometer for movies158 or restaurant ratings on Zagat’s 
or Yelp.  The notion of market price itself is, in a sense, a quantifiable metric 
based on qualitative assessments.159
B. Structure of the Market
It is not just what is bought and sold that determines negotiability; it’s 
also how it is sold.  Markets have various structural characteristics that 
determine whether the parties can negotiate over price.  Most of our 
consumer good exist in markets that propose a fixed price.  Shopping in a 
supermarket, for example, involves no negotiation—at most, a shopper may 
have to bargain to return an item without a receipt.  However, fixed prices 
are a relatively recent phenomenon.160 The two other methods of setting 
price are private negotiations (or direct bargaining) and auctions.161 Private 
negotiations were the primary means of commerce, and they remain familiar 
in the prototypical bazaar.162 Auctions are a structured set of consecutive
bids from competing potential buyers that result with the highest bid as the 
winner.163 All three structures are used in different markets, and some 
157 See generally Akerlof, supra note 46.
158 ROTTEN TOMATOES, “What is the Tomatometer™?”, 
https://www.rottentomatoes.com/about#whatisthetomatometer (last visited Oct. 14, 2020). 
159 See ELLEN RUPPEL SHELL, CHEAP: THE HIGH COST OF DISCOUNT CULTURE 57 (2009) 
(describing market price as “subjective” and noting that “[p]rice is a convenient, necessary proxy 
for a lot of other things”) (quoting sociologist Gerald Zaltman).
160 Olav Velthuis, Damien’s Dangerous Idea: Valuing Contemporary Art at Auction, in THE 
WORTH OF GOODS: VALUATION AND PRICING IN THE ECONOMY 178, 180 (Jens Beckert & Patrik 
Aspers eds., 2011).
161 Id. at 179–80.
162 Clifford Geertz, Suq: The Bazaar Economy in Sefrou, in MEANING AND ORDER IN 
MOROCCAN SOCIETY 221–22 (Clifford Geertz, Hildred Geertz & Lawrence Rosen eds., 1979).
163 Velthuis, supra note 160, at 180.
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markets are mixed: retail car sales, for example, have a fixed price but 
generally expect negotiation off of that price.164 Fixed prices have the lowest 
transaction costs, but they do not allow the price discrimination afforded by 
the other two markets.  But the negotiation variance is much higher with 
private negotiations than they are with pure versions of the other two 
systems.165 While auctions can be expensive to construct and run, the parties 
simply make a bid; they are not “negotiating” in the traditional sense of the 
word.166
The method of interaction is a related but conceptually different aspect 
of market structure.  Parties can communicate through rich or lean media, 
along a spectrum of a variety of signals and cajolery, or simply price and 
specifics.  Internet transactions generally have limited interactions; even if 
the online market allows for bargaining, those negotiations have usually been 
in the form or text or perhaps emojis.  The improving ability for wireless and 
wired service providers to carry bandwidth makes it easier to communicate 
through audio or even audio-visual communication.  But this communication 
will be different than in-person interaction, allowing for a different approach 
to negotiation.
Aspers also differentiates between fixed-role markets and switch-role 
markets.167 In fixed role markets, individuals are usually either buyers or 
sellers.  In switch-role markets, the parties change positions over time, 
serving as both buyers and sellers depending on the transaction.  Theoretical 
markets in economic texts for the most part assume switch-role markets, with 
atomistic relations between parties, despite the prevalence of fixed-role 
markets.168 Because switch-role markets, such as the traditional bazaar, 
emphasize the importance of trading qua trading, negotiation skills may be 
more valuable within these markets.169
And to the extent markets are creatures of law, the nature of that law 
will structure the market in myriad ways.  We will return more specifically 
to this topic in Part IV.A, when we examine the role of contract law in 
addressing negotiation variance.  But the rules of the market, as well as the 
ways in which those rules are interpreted, enforced, and potentially changed, 
can have a significant impact on the extent to which parties are left to their 
164 See Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg, Dealer Price Discrimination in New Car Purchases: 
Evidence from Consumer Expenditure Survey, 104 J. POL. ECON. 622, 623 (1996).
165 Velthuis, supra note 160, at 181 (“Economists have little more to say on private 
negotiations than that these are ‘best avoided’ because they are likely to result in ‘disagreement and 
inefficiency.’”) (quoting Paul Milgrom, Auctions and Bidding: A Primer, 3 J. ECON. PERSPS. 3, 19 
(1989)).
166 See Milgrom, supra note 165, at 18–19; Velthuis, supra note 160, at 181 (noting the time 
and expense necessary to host an auction, although noting that online auctions can be held less 
expensively).
167 ASPERS, supra note 149, at 83.
168 Id. at 83–84.
169 Id. at 84.
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own negotiating devices as opposed to appealing to allowing the system to 
dictate a nonnegotiated result.
C. Norms and Practices of the Market
A critical—but harder to measure—aspect of market negotiation 
variance is the extent to which the collected norms and practices of a 
particular market allow for or facilitate private bargaining.  As noted above, 
the practice of posted prices does not preclude buyers from endeavoring to 
get a better deal, but most markets have an accepted way of proceeding for 
most of the participants.170 These practices vary from market to market, and 
from culture to culture.  Modern Americans are thought to be more averse to 
bargaining than other cultures, with haggling appearing to be aggressive, 
unpleasant, and impolite.171 Other cultures have been purported to embrace 
bargaining more enthusiastically.172 But even in the United States, 
bargaining thrives in certain markets, but it finds ways to express itself that 
are socially acceptable within that market.  In her decades-long observations 
of garage sales, Gretchen Herrmann observed the following bargaining 
norms: negotiations should be brief; the buyer’s offer should not diverge too 
sharply from the listed price; buyers should not haggle over inexpensive 
items; negotiating on bulk purchases is seen as reasonable; bargaining over 
ever items is viewed distastefully; friends do not bargain; and bargaining is 
more acceptable and prevalent towards the end of the sale.173 Violations of 
the norms can shut down bargaining; or, it may work for a particular item 
but then cut the buyer off from further negotiations.
Standardized terms, known as boilerplate, are used in many industries 
to shortcut the bargaining process.  Standardized agreements, known as 
contracts of adhesion, collect a set of standardized terms into a form contract 
that is generally a take-it-or-leave-it affair.  These standardized arrangements 
save negotiation and other transactions costs by reducing the precontractual 
“negotiations” to a single decision.  They are meant to tilt the playing field 
in the direction of the drafter, with respect to terms over which the other 
170 Michael A. Arnold & Steven A. Lippman, Posted Prices versus Bargaining in Markets 
with Asymmetric Information, 36 ECON. INQUIRY 450, 450 (1998).
171 Gretchen M. Herrmann, Negotiating Culture: Conflict and Consensus in U.S. Garage-Sale 
Bargaining, 42 ETHNOLOGY 237, 238, 245 (2003); Ezra Rosser, Offsetting and the Consumption 
of Social Responsibility, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 27, 33 (2011) (“While in other countries there exists 
a tradition of negotiating over price, in the United States haggling is almost nonexistent.  And while 
consumers do comparison shop and bargain hunt, there is implicit acceptance that price corresponds 
to value and that price is market determined.”).
172 Herrmann, supra note 171, at 247 (“Other foreign-born residents, such as Russians,
Ukrainians, and Yugoslavians (self-designation), are known as avid bargainers.”); see also White, 
supra note 123, at 930 (extemporizing on differences between racial and ethnic groups).
173 Herrmann, supra note 171, at 246–47.
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party will not understand or care enough about to bargain.174 These forms 
tends to be common in the consumer context, and they have especially 
proliferated in the online environment.175
Markets also differ in terms of disclosure, transparency, and secrecy.  
To some extent, the information available about a transaction will depend on 
the characteristics of the transaction subject, as well as the economic and 
legal structure of the market.  In employment, for example, wages could 
easily be made publicly available, but for the most part the norm is to keep 
one’s pay private.176 These norms differ by career, status, and experience, 
but they provide for more room for negotiations over the exact contours of 
the employment relationship.  Secrecy leads to information asymmetry, 
which then provides a larger role for negotiation.177 Clifford Geertz has 
documented the role of information search and bargaining as a mixed process 
in the Moroccan bazaar.178 In contrast, markets with disclosed prices make 
it easier for buyers to compare and contrast, and for the market to reward 
lower prices and punish higher prices without actual bargaining taking place.
***
Overall, many markets have products, structures, or norms that reduce 
the role of bargaining in the transactional process.  But certain markets lend 
themselves to negotiation.  Our preliminary taxonomy is designed to provide 
a starting point for economics, sociological, psychological, and legal 
scholars in developing further insights into the role of negotiation in 
particular markets.  As legal scholars, we turn to examine the extent to which 
the law incorporates negotiation variance into its doctrines regarding 
transactions.
IV. NEGOTIATION VARIANCE AND THE LAW
An acknowledgement of negotiation variance is generally absent from 
the discussion of markets in various academic disciplines.  In this section, 
we turn expressly to law and examine the ways in which legal doctrines have 
addressed the role of negotiation ability in the transactional regulation.  We 
174 See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1173, 1177 (1983) (providing characteristics of adhesive contracts).
175 Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic 
Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 464 (2002) (“Notably, electronic contracts, like transactions in the 
paper world, are dominated by standard forms.”).
176 Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, “Love, Sex and Politics? Sure. Salary? No Way”: 
Workplace Social Norms and the Law, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 167, 168–69 (2004); 
Matthew A. Edwards, The Law and Social Norms of Pay Secrecy, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
41, 41–42, 47 n.37 (2005).
177 See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Lisa Bernstein, The Secrecy Interest in Contract Law, 109 
YALE L.J. 1885, 1886 (2000).
178 Geertz, supra note 89, at 31 (“From the point of view of search, the productive type of 
bargaining is that of the firmly clientelized buyer and seller exploring the dimensions of a particular, 
likely to be consummated transaction.”).
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begin with an overview of contract law and then move to specific 
examinations of settlement agreements, corporate combinations, and 
employment.  In each of these areas, the law does not overtly recognize 
negotiation’s influence, but its effects can be seen underneath the doctrinal 
surface.
A. Negotiation and the Common Law of Contract
The common law of contract provides the foundation for transactions 
in our economic system.179 The common law addresses a myriad number of 
aspects of the transactional process: formation, interpretation, defenses, 
conditions, and enforcement.  But negotiation per se is not specifically 
addressed.  The following subsection will explore the extent to which 
contract law acknowledges, accommodates, or regulates bargaining through 
doctrines that are not geared exclusively to negotiation but nevertheless 
encompass it. 
1. Requirement of a Bargain
Contracts require a bargain.  More specifically, “the formation of a 
contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent 
to the exchange and a consideration.”180 The Restatement defines the “two 
essential elements of a bargain” as “agreement and exchange.”181 The 
agreement usually manifests through an offer and an acceptance, which 
signify that the parties both are on the same page as to the terms of the 
contract.182 The exchange is represented through consideration, which 
requires a transaction in which the parties exchange something of value for 
another thing of value.  But consideration must be bargained for.  According 
to the bargain test of consideration, something is bargained for “if it is sought 
by the promisor in exchange for [the] promise and is given by the promisee 
in exchange for that promise.”183 One of the primary effects of the bargain 
requirement is to focus on transactions within a marketplace, while casting 
doubt on transactions within families or intimate relationships.184
179 See Hanoch Dagan, Avihay Dorfman, Roy Kreitner & Daniel Markovits, The Law of the 
Market, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2020) (draft at 4) (available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3516796) (“Contract is the key mechanism for exchanging entitlements, 
and this makes contract central to markets however conceived.”).
180 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
181 See id. § 17 cmt. b.
182 Id. § 22.
183 Id. § 71(2).
184 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 37, § 2.2, at 48.
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While courts have emphasized the need for a bargain, for the most part 
they have not required actual bargaining.185 Instead, the exchange can be 
arrived at simply, without haggling, as long as the parties each provide 
something of value in exchange for something of value.  A few courts have 
noted the lack of interchange between parties and therefore found an absence 
of consideration.186 For the most part, however, courts only police the 
exchange itself to insure that the contract is not a gift promise or gratuity.187
The bargaining itself is not subject to investigation, and neither is the fairness 
of the exchange.188 It is well-established contracts dogma that a party may 
exchange something as small as a peppercorn for something far more 
valuable, as long as the exchange is genuine.189
Commentators have noted that the sometimes-implicit idea behind 
contracts—that the parties will bargain with each other to reach their 
exchange—is becoming more of a myth than reality.  As one noted hornbook 
describes it:
Most of contract law is premised upon a model consisting of two alert 
individuals, mindful of their self-interest, hammering out an agreement by a 
process of hard bargaining.  The process of entering into a contract of 
adhesion, however “is not one of haggle or cooperative process but rather of 
a fly and flypaper.”  Courts, legislators and scholars have become 
increasingly aware of this divergence between the theory and practice of 
185 See, e.g., id. § 2.6, at 55 (“[I]t is not required that the parties actually bargain over the 
terms of their agreement.”); Pennsy Supply, Inc. v. Am. Ash Recycling Corp., 895 A.2d 595, 602 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (quoting E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 2.6
(1990)) (“The bargain theory of consideration does not actually require that the parties bargain over 
the terms of the agreement.”).
186 See, e.g., Jara v. Suprema Meats, Inc., 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 187, 197 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) 
(finding that one party’s failure to provide nothing “more than acquiescence” to the other party’s 
proposal “cannot be reasonably construed as a bid to enter into a bilateral contract”); Bogigian v. 
Bogigian, 551 N.E.2d 1149, 1151 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the parties “did not bargain
for the release in exchange for any benefits flowing to [one party] for detriments incurred by [the 
other party]”).
187 George S. Geis, Gift Promises and the Edge of Contract Law, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 663, 
668 n.14 (2014) (“A few courts seem to require evidence of negotiations or even haggling. . . . But 
this is an exaggerated view of the bargaining requirement and not the prevailing approach.”) 
(citations omitted).
188 FRIED, supra note 61, at 29 (“The law is not at all interested in the adequacy of the 
consideration.  The goodness of the exchange is for the parties alone to judge—the law is concerned 
only that there be an exchange.”); JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 
§ 4.4, at 154 (6th ed. 2009) (“As a general rule the courts do not review the adequacy of the 
consideration.  The parties make their own bargains.”).
189 Note, The Peppercorn Theory of Consideration and the Doctrine of Fair Exchange in 
Contract Law, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 1090, 1092 (1935) (arguing that value disparity in an exchange 
is supportable where the promisor “both knew and desired such disparity”) (emphasis omitted); 
Mark Klock, Unconscionability and Price Discrimination, 69 TENN. L. REV. 317, 343–44 (2002) 
(“The consideration can be as nominal as a peppercorn for the agreement to be legally enforceable.  
Courts do not inquire into the distribution of benefits between the parties.”).
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contract formation, and new techniques are evolving for coping with the 
challenges stemming from this divergence.190
Despite its name, however, the “bargain theory” of consideration does 
not concern itself with the level of negotiation that goes into a final 
agreement.
2. Parties’ Ability and Capacity to Negotiate
Contract law does not specifically examine or regulate the individual 
parties’ ability to negotiate.  However, certain existing defenses concern the 
underlying capacity of the parties in a way that may cover extreme types of 
negotiation variance.  The contractual defenses of infancy and incapacity are 
the primary escape hatches for those who may lack the capacity to contract 
for themselves—in Farnsworth’s words, “an inability to participate 
meaningfully in the bargaining process.”191 The immaturity defense is a 
bright-line rule in which anyone under a certain cutoff age can render the 
contract voidable after the fact.192 The reasoning behind this defense is that 
as a class, younger people do not have the reasoning, understanding, or 
judgment to responsibly bargain for a binding deal.193 Incapacity generally 
relates to a permanent or temporary underlying condition that renders one 
“unable to understand . . . the nature and consequences of the transaction,” 
or “unable to act in a reasonable manner in relation to the transaction.”194
However, courts have recognized something of an exception where the 
underlying contract is fair, either by fudging the finding of incapacity195 or 
through a specific “fairness exception.”196 For some forms of incapacity, 
especially intoxication, courts have only permitted the defense where the 
other party knew of the incapacity and was in a position to take advantage of 
it during the negotiations.197
The closest that courts have come to taking into account an individual’s 
own ability to bargain effectively is through the doctrine of 
unconscionability.  Dating back to the English courts of equity, judges have 
190 PERILLO, supra note 188, at 5 (quoting Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U.
L. REV. 131, 143 (1970)).
191 FARNSWORTH, supra note 37, § 4.2, at 219.
192 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 14 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (rendering contracts 
voidable “until the beginning of the day before the person’s eighteenth birthday”).
193 See, e.g., Porter v. Wilson, 209 A.2d 730, 731 (N.H. 1965) (citing to “the common-law 
conception that a minor does not possess the discretion and experience of adults”); Henry v. Root, 
33 N.Y. 526, 536 (1865) (noting that the defense’s purpose is to “protect infants or minors from 
their own improvidence and folly”).
194 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
195 PERILLO, supra note 188, § 8.9 at 263 (“[I]f the contract is fair and beneficial to the alleged 
incompetent there will be a great tendency to find sanity; otherwise, the tendency is to find lack of 
capacity.”).
196 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15(2) (AM. L. INST. 1981).
197 Id. § 15(1)(b); id. § 16.
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routinely, though infrequently, policed agreements on the basis of their 
unfairness.198 The unfairness of the terms themselves tells part of the story, 
but courts must also figure out why the one party ended up with such a bad 
deal.  As a result, the doctrine has broken down into two conjunctive parts: 
substantive unconscionability and procedural unconscionability.199
Substantive unconscionability refers to “unreasonably favorable” terms; 
procedural unconscionability refers to the process by which those terms were 
reached.200 As described by Allan Farnsworth: “Procedural 
unconscionability is broadly conceived to encompass not only the 
employment of sharp bargaining practices and the use of fine print and 
convoluted language, but a lack of understanding and an inequality of 
bargaining power, a term that is often used to include bargaining skill.”201
Procedural unconscionability can include many elements that do not 
specifically include negotiation ability.  For example, arbitration clauses are 
frequently challenged in consumer or employment contracts, not based on 
the individual’s negotiation effectiveness, but rather on the structural issues 
of using standard-form agreements that are required for purchase or 
employment.202 Even when the courts cite to a “gross inequality of 
bargaining power,” they largely mean structural issues such as monopoly 
power, disaggregated consumers or employees, or contracts of adhesion.203
For a set of unconscionability cases, however, courts have looked at a 
party’s lack of education, lower social status, or personality traits to conclude 
that the other party took advantage of a bargaining weakness.  In the case of 
Wollums v. Horsley,204 the court denied enforcement of a contract in which 
Wollums had sold mineral rights on his property to Horsley for much less 
than market price.  Discussing the parties’ relative bargaining abilities, the 
court noted that Wollums was “about [sixty] years old, uneducated, afflicted 
with disease disabling him from work,” while Horsley was “a man of large 
and varied experience in business.”205 This theme is echoed in other cases.  
In Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., perhaps our most influential 
unconscionability case, the buyer was “a person of limited education 
separated from her husband, [who] is maintaining herself and her seven 
198 FARNSWORTH, supra note 37, § 4.27, at 294–95.
199 Id. § 4.28, at 301.
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 See, e.g., Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and 
the Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1459–64 (2008); Steven J. Burton, 
The New Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Federal Preemption, Contract Unconscionability, and 
Agreements to Arbitrate, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 469, 470 (2006).
203 See, e.g., Rizzo v. Allstate Ins. Co., 185 A.3d 836, 843 (N.H. 2018); Bagley v. Mt. 
Bachelor, Inc., 340 P.3d 27, 35, 39 (Or. 2014) (en banc).
204 Wollums v. Horsley, 20 S.W. 781, 782 (Ky. 1892).
205 Id. at 781.
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children by means of public assistance.”206 Lack of education or 
“sophistication” are factors in the courts’ determination that one party was 
prone to disadvantage in negotiations,207 especially when paired with the 
other party’s relative expertise.208 Conversely, equal bargaining ability has 
been a factor in finding no unconscionability.209
The unconscionability cases show the difficulty in trying to separate 
negotiation effectiveness from other overlapping characteristics and factors.  
Education and sophistication are used as a proxy not only for the ability to 
bargain well, but also for the ability to use information, and even get the 
information in the first place.  The arbitration cases illustrate this: courts 
point to the fact that the clauses are often complicated and confusing, which 
means that the average consumer or employee does not have the 
understanding of the long-term ramifications of the clause.210 But in such 
cases, courts either refer to some baseline level of ability, or point out how 
the particular party would have particular difficulty in bargaining for the 
contract.211 Negotiation effectiveness is considered, but often in a bundle 
with other overlapping considerations.
206 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914, 915 (D.C. 1964).
207 See, e.g., High v. Cap. Senior Living Props. 2-Heatherwood, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 2d 789, 
799 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (“[To determine procedural unconscionability, a court must] focus on the 
‘real and voluntary meeting of the minds’ of the parties at the time that the contract was executed 
and consider factors such as: ‘(1) relative bargaining power; (2) age; (3) education; (4) intelligence; 
(5) business savvy and experience; (6) the drafter of the contract; and (7) whether the terms were 
explained to the ‘weaker’ party.’”); Manley v. Personacare, No. 2005-L-174, 2007 WL 210583, at 
*2 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2007) (“‘Procedural unconscionability involves those factors bearing on 
the relative bargaining position of the contracting parties, including their age, education, 
intelligence, business acumen and experience, relative bargaining power, who drafted the contract, 
whether the terms were explained to the weaker party, and whether alterations in the printed terms 
were possible.’”) (quoting Cross v. Carnes, 724 N.E.2d 828, 837 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998)).
208 Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 236 A.2d 843, 856 (N.J. 1967) (discussing situations 
where parties with “experience, specialization, licensure, economic strength or position, or 
membership in associations created for their mutual benefit and education, have acquired such 
expertise or monopolistic or practical control in the business transaction involved as to give them 
an undue advantage”).
209 See, e.g., Kerr-McGee Corp. v. N. Utils. Inc., 673 F.2d 323, 330 (10th Cir. 1982) (finding 
no unconscionability when “experienced negotiators for both parties entered into an agreement 
after several months of give-and-take”).
210 See, e.g., Villa Milano Homeowners Ass’n v. Il Davorge, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 11 (Ct. App. 
2000) (discussing a “prolix form” that was a “deliberate attempt to circumvent statutory 
protections”).
211 See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965) 
(“The manner in which the contract was entered is also relevant to this consideration.  Did each 
party to the contract, considering his obvious education or lack of it, have a reasonable opportunity 
to understand the terms of the contract, or were the important terms hidden in a maze of fine print 
and minimized by deceptive sales practices?”).
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3. Structure of the Market 
Certain markets employ tactics that severely limit or eliminate one 
party’s ability to bargain over the terms of the deal.  In most cases, the law 
neither facilitates nor hinders these practices.  Posted and fixed prices are 
one method of eliminating the transaction costs related to bargaining.  The 
law does not particularly encourage or discourage the use of fixed prices for 
consumers; the market has adopted this practice to adjust to mass retail 
shopping practices.212 Courts have occasionally grumbled about the fixed 
nature of contracts of adhesion, noting that they drain the idea of the 
bargaining process of any actual back-and-forth.213 With the proliferation of 
such agreements in modern commerce, especially online, courts have largely 
acquiesced even with the knowledge that there has been no bargaining or 
even understanding from one consumer.  While “click-wrap” agreements are 
the subject of much debate by academics, judges, and policymakers,214 for 
our purposes we can note that they are common and that they reduce 
negotiation variance within their marketplaces, at least on the part of the 
consumer or employee.
4. Nature of Relationship and Conduct between Parties
The common law of contract polices the conduct of parties within the 
negotiations.  Threats of violence are also not a legitimate bargaining tactic.  
The defense of duress renders a contract void—nonexistent—when 
“physically compelled,”215 and the contract is voidable if “induced by an 
improper threat by the other party that leaves the victim no reasonable 
alternative.”216 Such threats are usually not considered to be within the realm 
of legitimate negotiation efforts.  
Similarly, parties cannot endeavor to distort the pool of information on 
which the other party is depending.  Fraud or misrepresentation is not 
212 State truth-in-advertising laws, as well as the Federal Trade Act’s prohibition on deceptive 
practices, does mean that fixed prices cannot be changed after the fact to make them higher.  15 
U.S.C. § 45(a) (2018); 16 C.F.R. § 238.1 (2011) (“No advertisement containing an offer to sell a 
product should be published when the offer is not a bona fide effort to sell the advertised product.”).
213 FARNSWORTH, supra note 37, § 4.26, at 285 (“Traditional contract law was designed for 
a paradigmatic agreement that had been reached by two parties of equal bargaining power by a 
process of free negotiation.  Today, however, in routine transactions the typical agreement consists 
of a standard printed form containing terms prepared by one party and assented to by the other with 
little or no opportunity for negotiation.”).
214 For a description of one recent effort at the problem by reporters for the American Law 
Institute, see Oren Bar-Gill, Omri Ben-Shahar & Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Searching for the 
Common Law: The Quantitative Approach of the Restatement of Consumer Contracts, 84 U. CHI.
L. REV. 7, 10–11 (2017).
215 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 174 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
216 Id. § 175.  The scope of improper threats beyond injury includes crimes, torts, criminal or 
civil prosecution, and bad faith.  Id. § 176.
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permitted; unintentional misrepresentation is merely a contract defense,
while intentional fraud can also be a tort or a crime.217 Generally parties are 
not required to disclose information except under circumstances involving 
bad faith or prior assertions.218 To the extent that lying may be considered a 
valid negotiation move by some, the law tolerates it if the matter is not 
material or does not induce the other party to form the contract.219 One can 
generally prevaricate when discussing a reservation point or bargaining 
position.220 Even though these are “lies,” they are set aside as legitimate 
methods for use in negotiations.
Moving beyond factual information, parties have much more flexibility 
in how they present their case.  Generally, there is no defense against an 
intentionally incorrect opinion, as the party is not justified in relying on it.221
Similarly permitted is so-called puffery: “a ‘vague statement’ boosting the 
appeal of a service or product that, because of its vagueness and unreliability, 
is immunized from regulation.”222 Puffery is a well-worn sales tactic that at 
times skirts the line between permissible and unlawful.  To the extent that 
courts have found opinions and puffery to raise a defense against 
enforcement, they have focused on more extreme cases in which one side 
seems to have gotten the better of the other.  Commentators have framed 
these efforts at enforcement as a way of policing the fairness of agreements 
and the negotiations that led to them.223 But one of their concerns is disparity 
in negotiation effectiveness.
One prominent example of crossing the line is casebook staple Vokes v. 
Arthur Murray, Inc.224 Plaintiff Vokes, a widow who prepaid over $30,000 
(between 1961–62) for over 2000 hours of dance lessons, sought the return 
of the monies she had advanced to the company.  Rather than looking to 
217 Id. § 164 (AM. L. INST. 1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (AM. L. INST.
1977); MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.3 (AM. L. INST. 1980).
218 Id. § 161.
219 Id. § 164.
220 See White, supra note 123, at 927–28.
221 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 169 (AM. L. INST. 1981). The exceptions to 
the rule include fiduciary relationships, the invocation of special skill, judgment, or objectivity, and 
particular susceptibility to misrepresentation.  Id.
222 David A. Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1395, 1397 (2006); 
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 169 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“It may be 
assumed, for example, that a seller will express a favorable opinion concerning what he has to sell.  
When he praises it in general terms, commonly known as ‘puffing’ or ‘sales talk,’ without specific 
content or reference to facts, buyers are expected to understand that they are not entitled to rely.”).
223 Hoffman, supra note 200, at 1398 (“Courts seek to discourage speech leading to ‘bad’ 
consumption and to protect speech leading to ‘good’ consumption.”); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas 
A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 630, 724 (1999) (“Once it is acknowledged that consumer risk perceptions may be affected 
by, for instance, the manner in which information is framed, then it becomes inevitable that 
manufacturers will exploit those framing effects in a way that maximizes manufacturer profits.”).
224 212 So. 2d 906 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
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unconscionability or incapacity, the court relied on false representations as 
to Vokes’s dancing ability.  The studio had used “false representations to her 
that she was improving in her dancing ability, that she had excellent 
potential, that she was responding to instructions in dancing grace, and that 
they were developing her into a beautiful dancer.”225 Such blandishments 
must be fairly routine; it’s hard to imagine much success for instructors who 
are ruthlessly honest about their students’ skills.  But it is extraordinary for 
a dance student to agree to pay such sums ahead of the actual lessons.  The 
court believed that “it should have been reasonably apparent to defendants 
that her vast outlay of cash for the many hundreds of additional hours of 
instruction was not justified by her slow and awkward progress, which she 
would have been made well aware of if they had spoken the ‘whole truth.’”226
Clearly, the studio had taken advantage of Vokes, and the court stepped in—
with a fairly stretched version of misrepresentation—to prevent the bargain 
from being enforced.
The Vokes case has been categorized under the “special skill or 
judgment” exception to the general freedom to opine.  There is also an 
exception for parties who are particularly susceptible to being misled by false 
opinions.  The exception is aimed at those who are “particularly vulnerable 
to misrepresentation,” and includes “lack of intelligence, illiteracy, and 
unusual credulity or gullibility.”227 These cases are also handled under the 
doctrine of undue influence.  Although many of the undue influence cases 
involve special relationships (such as fiduciaries),228 the defense also 
encompasses situations in which a more talented negotiator wheedles an 
unfair bargain out of a näif.  The Restatement defines undue influence as 
“unfair persuasion of a party who is under the domination of the person 
exercising the persuasion or who by virtue of the relation between them is 
justified in assuming that that person will not act in a manner inconsistent 
with [their] welfare.”229 John Calamari and Joseph Perillo cite to four factors 
in finding a prima facie case of undue influence: (1) susceptibility to 
influence, (2) opportunity to use influence, (3) disposition to take advantage, 
and (4) an unfair result.230
Undue influence provides courts with a tool to rescue the victims of 
one-sided negotiations from the consequences, even in the absence of fraud 
225 Id. at 908.
226 Id. at 909.
227 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 169 cmt. e (AM. L. INST. 1981). See also Adan 
v. Steinbrecher, 133 N.W. 477, 478 (Minn. 1911) (citing to the facts that “the parties were not 
dealing at arm’s length; that plaintiff was wholly ignorant of the value of property; that by the 
improper influence exercised over him pending the negotiations by defendant’s agent he was 
deprived of an opportunity to learn the truth”).
228 FARNSWORTH, supra note 37, § 4.20, at 264–65.
229 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
230 PERILLO, supra note 188, § 9.10, at 287–88.
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or duress.  In Foote v. Wilson,231 the court singled out a merchant who cajoled 
a farmer into buying his wholesale supplies without an inventory:
So–called “dealers’ talk” . . . is morally reprehensible because it is intended to 
produce the psychological effect of representation without incurring the penalties 
of representation.  Tradesmen of the better class scorn to resort to it. . . . A few 
dealers still cling to the double standard of morals—one for church on Sunday, 
and one for business on week days.  They display raucous mirth at the 
“sentimental” notion that men are their brothers’ keepers in business, and that the 
Golden Rule applies to the relation between buyer and seller, and they exercise 
in full the privilege of trimming with luring “opinions,” seductive “puffing,” and 
shrewdly equivocal “shop talk,” still permitted them by the remnant of the 
discredited doctrine of caveat emptor.232
This jeremiad against salesmanship—at least in its extreme version—
illustrates the use of undue influence to police bargaining results.  
Another undue influence case provides a list of hard-bargaining tactics 
indicative of undue influence:
[O]verpersuasion is generally accompanied by certain characteristics which tend 
to create a pattern.  The pattern usually involves several of the following 
elements: (1) discussion of the transaction at an unusual or inappropriate time, 
(2) consummation of the transaction in an unusual place, (3) insistent demand 
that the business be finished at once, (4) extreme emphasis on untoward 
consequences of delay, (5) the use of multiple persuaders by the dominant side 
against a single servient party, (6) absence of third-party advisers to the servient 
party, (7) statements that there is no time to consult financial advisers or 
attorneys.  If a number of these elements are simultaneously present, the 
persuasion may be characterized as excessive.233
As these cases point out, the law does not generally police bargaining 
behavior.234 But for the exceptional cases of hard bargaining, these defenses 
are available to correct the injustice.
Despite these many doctrines that do regulate the parties’ behavior in 
the context of negotiations, the common law does not require bargaining in 
good faith.235 The notion of good faith has primarily applied to post-
formation performance, and the idea is to prevent opportunism after the fact 
by interpreting the contract in a way that violates its spirit.236 Before the 
231 178 P. 430 (Kan. 1919).
232 Id. at 430–31.
233 Odorizzi v. Bloomfield Sch. Dist., 53 Cal. Rptr. 533, 541 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966); see also 
Methodist Mission Home of Tex. v. N—— A—— B——, 451 S.W.2d 539, 542–43 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1970) (upholding finding that “plaintiff was subjected to excessive persuasion”).
234 Methodist Mission, 451 S.W.2d at 543 (“It is true that exerted influence cannot be branded 
as ‘undue’ merely because it is persuasive and effective, and that the law does not condemn all 
persuasion, entreaty, cajolery, importunity, intercession, argument and solicitation.”); Odorizzi, 53 
Cal. Rptr. at 541 (“The difficulty, of course, lies in determining when the forces of persuasion have 
overflowed their normal banks and become oppressive flood waters.”).
235 FARNSWORTH, supra note 37, § 3.26, at 189; PERILLO, supra note 188, § 11.38, at 412. 
236 FARNSWORTH, supra note 37, § 8.15, at 566.
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contract has been formed, the parties have not committed to the joint 
performance, and therefore do not have the implied covenant of treating each 
other in good faith.237 But parties have been punished for breaching 
agreements to negotiate in good faith, including cases in which the 
agreement was implied from the parties’ behavior or enforced through 
promissory estoppel.  In Copeland v. Baskin Robbins U.S.A.,238 the court 
found that the parties had impliedly promised to bargain in good faith, and 
that one party had failed to do so.  The court stated: “[W]e believe there are 
sound public policy reasons for protecting parties to a business negotiation 
from bad faith practices by their negotiating partners.  Gone are the days 
when our ancestors sat around a fire and bargained for the exchange of stone 
axes for bear hides.  Today the stakes are much higher and negotiations are 
much more complex.”239 In a significant line of well-known cases, courts 
have held parties to their promises during negotiations, even if (or especially 
if) no agreement has been reached.240
* * *
On the surface, the common law of contract purports to let the parties 
bargain unfettered by restrictions.  However, we have seen that in numerous 
doctrines, courts act in part to correct the results of negotiations that they 
find to be unfair or substantially uneven.  Certainly, as a general rule, courts 
are not overtly concerned with high levels of negotiation variance.  But when 
confronted with situations in which one party has used that variance to take 
advantage of the other, they will at times step to adjust the bargain 
accordingly.
B. Regulating in High-Negotiation Variance Markets
The story is similar in individual markets: the law does not overtly take 
negotiation effectiveness into account, but the effects ripple through 
underneath the surface.  In markets with high-negotiation variance, 
assumptions about the consistency of market price, the fairness of the 
outcome, and the role of the parties within the negotiation do not hold true.  
We look at three high-variance markets—the markets for lawsuit 
237 Mkt. St. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Before the 
contract is signed, the parties confront each other with a natural wariness.  Neither expects the other 
to be particularly forthcoming, and therefore there is no deception when one is not.  Afterwards the 
situation is different.”).
238 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 875, 884 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
239 Id.
240 See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 37, § 3.26, at 196–201; Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 
Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267, 274–75 (Wis. 1965).
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settlements, corporate control, and employment—and examine how the law 
has responded to the potential for negotiation imbalance within them.241
1. Market for Lawsuit Settlements
Common wisdom about lawsuits in the last forty years of law and 
economics scholarship posits that most cases will settle, and settlement has 
been modeled as following a fairly straightforward calculus.  When the 
settlement value is greater for the plaintiff (and lower for the defendant) than 
the expected value of the case at trial, subtracting transaction costs, 
settlement will occur.242 When there is mutual agreement as to the case’s 
expected trial value, then all cases should settle.243 Because parties do not 
always have perfect, symmetrical information,244 and/or because the law is 
uncertain,245 they may not agree, and this lack of agreement, in the world of 
economic analysis, is what stymies agreement.  
Scholars of litigation processes have made efforts to build models to 
predict which cases will go to trial.  George Priest and Benjamin Klein, for 
example, focus on disagreement about the law as the key determinant of 
settlement versus trial.246 They argue that cases where settlement will not be 
reached are most likely to be those with uncertain legal outcomes based on 
existing precedent; thus, cases that go to trial should thus be resolved in court 
with approximately an even split between victories for the plaintiff and for 
the defendant.247 Other scholars have focused more on the information 
asymmetries as the determinant of settlement: for instance, Steven Shavell 
argued against Priest and Klein’s “even split” prediction, positing that tried 
cases could land with any probability distribution for the parties’ victories; 
the determinant would be asymmetrical information between the plaintiff 
241 These are by no means the only high-negotiation-variance markets.  See, e.g., Levmore & 
Fagan, supra note 6, at 1491–98 (discussing automobile sales, medical services, and law school 
scholarships).
242 Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their 
Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1067, 1075 (1989); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The 
Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1984).
243 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 568–89 (6th ed. 2003); Steven 
Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the 
Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 63–64 (1982).
244 POSNER, supra note 243, at 69–70; Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement Under 
Imperfect Information, 15 RAND J. ECON. 404, 404 (1984).
245 POSNER, supra note 243, at 589.
246 See Priest & Klein, supra note 242.
247 Id. at 4–5.
HOLLANDER-BLUMOFF & BODIE-SSRN (DO NOT DELETE) 12/15/2020 3:49 PM
202X] D E S K T O P  P U B L I S H I N G  E X A M P L E 147
and defendant.248 Empirical data in a variety of studies have not consistently 
borne out the “even split” hypothesis.249
In these models, there is little room for individual human behavior 
around negotiation: there is no term in these equations for negotiation skill 
or effectiveness or variation based on the specific interpersonal interaction 
rather than on structural factors.  These models predict that parties with 
complete information, in a system where the law is fully known and 
predictable, would all settle their cases250—presumably for a similar 
amount—an amount that perfectly accounted for the expected value of the 
case minus the transaction costs.  Yet even if such information were 
exchanged and the law was fully transparent, negotiation scholars would 
insist with certainty that outcomes would vary widely (even if they all 
satisfied the baseline conditions of surpassing for the party the value of the 
case minus transaction costs).  
What this suggests for the selection of cases for dispute is complicated 
and difficult to reduce to a single variable.  As discussed above, negotiation 
skill and effectiveness are multifaceted constructs that include a variety of 
types of behavior, and depend on the unique interaction between the parties.  
However, considering the role of negotiation acumen in how, when, and 
whether cases settle can illuminate some of the challenges in pinning down 
an answer to what kinds of cases will go to trial.  It is not even as simple as 
looking at the skill level of the lawyers involved to make a prediction about 
whether or not settlement will occur.  That is, consider the matrix of potential 
poor or skilled negotiators in the very simplest of two-party interactions:
Lawyer A: Poor Lawyer A: Skilled
Lawyer B: Poor Poor / Poor Poor / Skilled
Lawyer B: Skilled Skilled / Poor Skilled / Skilled
Nothing about these match-ups is certain, and any effort to make 
predictions is necessarily speculative until more data about these dyadic 
processes are gathered.  For example, one might imagine that two skilled 
negotiators would reach agreement any time a settlement offer is greater than 
the value of the case less transaction costs.  However, more skilled 
negotiators might each set higher aspirations for their negotiation outcome, 
248 Steven Shavell, Any Frequency of Plaintiff Victory at Trial Is Possible, 25 J. LEGAL STUD.
493, 500 (1996).
249 Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework with 
Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337, 339–40 (1990); Keith N. Hylton, Asymmetric Information 
and the Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 188 (1993); Joel Waldfogel, 
The Selection Hypothesis and the Relationship between Trial and Plaintiff Victory, 103 J. POL.
ECON. 229, 255–56 (1995); Donald Wittman, Is the Selection of Cases for Trial Biased?, 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 185, 185 (1985).
250 Shavell, supra note 243, at 64.
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and their clients might have similarly higher expectations.  Two poor 
negotiators might bumble till neither could reach agreement, but even one 
poor negotiator may put an offer on the table that is too good to pass up by 
the other side.  And the mismatched pair is likely to be equally unpredictable: 
stuck at the whim of a poor negotiator, a good negotiator may be hamstrung, 
or a good negotiator may be able to guide the negotiation smoothly to a 
satisfactory outcome.  In addition, the two-party model only hints at the true 
complexity of the negotiation process in litigation.  Lawyers (even in a 
simple two-party suit) negotiate not just with one another but with their own 
clients.251 Intractable clients, laissez-faire clients, clients who have concerns 
beyond economic outcomes—all of these factors may influence the success 
of the lawyer at crafting a durable settlement agreement.  While lawyers 
exert influence over their clients, their clients also retain ultimate settlement 
authority.252 Any effort to model the way in which effective negotiation 
yields cases for trial versus settlement is exceptionally complicated and 
unlikely to yield accurate prediction based on current data, but it is a mistake 
to simply write off the negotiation process as meaningless in yielding case 
outcomes.  
Negotiation has not been ignored entirely by those who study case 
settlement.  Robert Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser’s influential exploration 
of the way that legal endowments help to play a role in guiding outcomes for 
legal cases changed perceptions of the ways in which negotiations proceeded 
in the legal arena.253 Their “bargaining in the shadow of the law” shaped 
perspectives on negotiation for years to come, guiding numerous scholars to 
consider the role of legal rules in an array of different settings.254 Mnookin 
and Kornhauser explicitly focus on negotiation as the process by which 
settlement is reached.255 But what is most notable, for our purposes here, is 
that their focus is exclusively on the role that the law plays in what they call 
251 See, e.g., Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Just Negotiation, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 381, 420–
31 (2010).
252 See, e.g., Donald G. Gifford, The Synthesis of Legal Counseling and Negotiation Models: 
Preserving Client-Centered Advocacy in the Negotiation Context, 34 UCLA L. REV. 811, 839–42 
(1987); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and 
Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REV. 637, 664 (1976); Herbert M. Kritzer, Contingent-Fee Lawyers and 
Their Clients: Settlement Expectations, Settlement Realities, and Issues of Control in the Lawyer-
Client Relationship, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 795, 796–98 (1998); Jennifer K. Robbennolt,
Attorneys, Apologies, and Settlement Negotiation, 13 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 349, 364 (2008); 
Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New Look at the 
Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77, 82 (1997).
253 See generally Mnookin &Kornhauser, supra note 147.
254 Indeed, there is almost a cottage industry in “in the shadow of” articles.  See, e.g., Marc 
L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Early Settlement in GATT/WTO 
Disputes, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 158, 158 (2000); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Bargaining in the 
Shadow of Copyright Law After Tasini, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 605, 605 (2003); Guhan 
Subramanian, Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover Defenses, 113 YALE L.J. 621, 621 (2003).  
255 Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 147, at 950.
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the “bargaining process,” not considering the inverse—that is, the role that 
the negotiation itself might eventually play in shaping the law.  
Nor did Mnookin and Kornhauser go deep into the negotiation process, 
beyond the idea of bargaining power, to critically examine the role of 
negotiation skill in these cases.  They identify factors that they see as the 
most “important influences or determinants of the outcomes of bargaining,” 
which are: 
(1) the preferences of the divorcing parents; (2) the bargaining 
endowments created by legal rules that indicate the particular allocation a 
court will impose if the parties fail to reach agreement; (3) the degree of 
uncertainty concerning the legal outcome if the parties go to court, which is 
linked to the parties’ attitudes towards risk; (4) transaction costs and the 
parties’ respective abilities to bear them; and (5) strategic behavior.256
While acknowledging only one real “process” factor, strategic 
behavior, they go on to state that “[t]he actual bargain that is struck through 
negotiations—indeed, whether a bargain is struck at all—depends on the 
negotiation process.”257
So, what is so-called “strategic behavior” in this negotiation arena?  
Scholars in this area have essentialized strategic behavior to issues around 
information and misrepresentation.  Mnookin and Kornhauser give several 
examples: first, regarding information exchange, they note, “information 
may be accurate or intentionally inaccurate; each party may promise, 
threaten, or bluff.”258 In addition, they focus on communication about the 
state of the governing law: “Parties may intentionally exaggerate their 
chances of winning in court in the hope of persuading the other side to accept
less.  Or they may threaten to impose substantial transaction costs—
economic or psychological—on the other side.”259
This vision of strategic behavior does implicitly allow for differences 
in ability to “promise, threaten, or bluff,” or to utilize rules, precedent, and 
reason, but there is no further elaboration on the potential for differences in 
ability to deploy these strategies and associated tactics more or less 
effectively.  In fact, the decision to engage in one process or the other, and 
to what extent, seems to be the primary decision point for their imagined 
negotiator.  And so-called “strategic behavior” is largely based in 
misrepresentation, information withholding, and threats: for example, 
Mnookin and Kornhauser later assert that negotiation may fail to yield an 
outcome if “the parties get heavily engaged in strategic behavior and get 
carried away with making threats.”260
256 Id. at 966.
257 Id. at 972.
258 Id. 
259 Id. at 972–73.
260 Id. at 975.
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Even taking a more expansive view of strategic behavior—for example, 
defining it as more broadly as “trying to maneuver an opponent into 
accepting an unfavorable distribution“—leaves much room for individuals 
to be better or worse in this arena.261 While highlighting that there are 
“skillful bargainer[s]” whose “objective . . . is to convince others that [they] 
intend[] to act in such a way that it is in [the other party’s] best interest to do 
what is in [their] best interest,”262 scholars have noted that the “array of 
possible strategies is virtually unlimited.”263 While this relative complexity 
does not match the streamlined “modeling games” so prominent in academic 
discussion of legal settlement,264 even the broadest version of strategic 
bargaining described here is in turn relatively thin in comparison to the vast 
scope of psychological and economic research on bargaining and 
negotiation, which characterizes dozens, if not hundreds, of different types 
of behavior as more or less effective in negotiation.
In essence, previous literature on legal settlement uses an economic 
framework to predict negotiation success or failure, but typically isolates 
only one element of negotiation “skill”—that is, largely, the ability to 
conceal information, make misrepresentations, and employ threats.  Even the 
broadest definition of strategic behavior relies on a win-lose, zero-sum 
framework and hones in on what a negotiator does in order to manipulate the 
other party into accepting an unfavorable outcome.  And even in this broader 
definition of strategic behavior, the approach is fairly crabbed, failing to 
engage meaningfully in a more sophisticated exploration of what factors 
actually contribute to negotiation effectiveness.  
Much of the extant literature relies on a vision of negotiation as win-
lose bargaining game that is belied by the rich tapestry of social science and 
negotiation literature.  While it is certainly the case that some negotiations 
are characterized by this kind of strategic behavior, it is also the case that 
even in those settings, some negotiators will be more or less effective in 
employing these kinds of tactics.  Some individuals are better than others at 
concealment or misrepresentation, some are more credible in making threats, 
others still are more efficacious in ferreting out dishonesty or threats that 
lack true leverage.  Still others may be more or less skilled in illuminating 
opportunities to shift from a win-lose to a win-win perspective, or in 
generating collaborative problem-solving outcomes.  All of these features of 
effective negotiators—complex though they may be—can have a 
261Robert Cooter & Stephen Marks with Robert Mnookin, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: 
A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 228 (1982).
262 Id.
263 Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations 
and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 328 (1991).
264 In light of the complexity of strategic bargaining, Gross and Syverud add, “[m]ost research 
on bargaining in litigation consists . . . of modeling games that restrict the structure of offers, 
demands, and access to information in ways quite alien to actual litigation.”  Id. at 330.
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meaningful—albeit currently unpredictable—impact on the set of cases that 
settle versus going to trial.
2. Market for Corporate Control
The market for corporate control refers to the market for a controlling 
percentage of shares for publicly held corporations.  A majority of 
outstanding shares is sufficient, but often less can provide control.265 As 
developed in Henry Manne’s classic article on the subject, the market exists 
apart from the trade in individual shares and offers opportunities for 
companies to combine or be absorbed into a larger whole.266 Purchasing 
control rights allows the buyer to implement changes in managerial policies 
and then reap the rewards from those changes.267 Thus, the most important 
function of the market is to discipline corporate executives who might 
otherwise grow complacent in a diffusely-held company by threatening their 
hold over governance.268
For publicly traded companies, one might think that the market for 
corporate control is entirely devolved to electronic markets, and there is little 
room for negotiation when shares are bought on public exchanges like the 
New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ.269 These exchanges are perhaps 
the quintessential example of a low-negotiation-variance market—one 
where the parties only interact on a binary, yes-no basis and there is no 
bargaining over price or other terms.  But the market for corporate control 
operates differently than the public market for shares.  Due to federal 
regulation, a party looking to purchase a controlling share of a public 
company must announce its intentions once it owns or controls more than 
265 Many twenty-first century tech companies, such as Facebook and Google, provided their 
founders with controlling stakes through share holdings that have greater voting rights than the 
common shares.  Dorothy S. Lund, Nonvoting Shares and Efficient Corporate Governance, 71 
STAN. L. REV. 687, 694, 704–05 (2019); Steven Davidoff Solomon, Snap’s Plan Is Most Unfriendly 
to Outsiders, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/business/dealbook/snap-ipo-plan-evan-spiegel.html.
266 Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 
112 (1965) (“The basic proposition advanced in this paper is that the control of corporations may 
constitute a valuable asset; that this asset exists independent of any interest in either economics of 
scale or monopoly profits; that an active market for corporate control exists; and that a great many 
mergers are probably the result of the successful workings of this special market.”).
267 Id. at 113 (“The lower the stock price, relative to what it could be with more efficient 
management, the more attractive the take-over becomes to those who believe that they can manage 
the company more efficiently.  And the potential return from the successful takeover and 
revitalization of a poorly run company can be enormous.”).
268 Id. (“Only the take-over scheme provides some assurance of competitive efficiency among 
corporate managers and thereby affords strong protection to the interests of vast numbers of small, 
non-controlling shareholders.”).
269 For a discussion of the role of microseconds in the sales of shares, see generally MICHAEL 
LEWIS, FLASH BOYS (2014).
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five percent of the target company’s shares.270 It is not possible for a 
company to silently or secretly suck up shares on the exchanges and then 
suddenly announce a controlling stake.  Because of this structure, 
negotiations over the purchase of a controlling stake are done in public 
through a tender offer or occur behind the closed doors of executive suites.  
It is these private negotiations in which negotiating ability can have an 
outsized effect on the outcome. 
Discussions over corporate takeovers are held at the highest levels of 
corporate governance and finance.  Because of the desire for secrecy and the 
need for the negotiating parties to have true bargaining authority, only top 
executives participate.  Although companies are only “in play” at particular 
moments in their history, the market for corporate control essentially consists 
of corporate executives, specifically CEOs, and those institutions or 
individuals who control a large amount of capital, advised by a small coterie 
of consultants, accountants, attorneys, and investment bankers.  
Confidentiality in these talks is important to avoid the encouragement of 
competitors into the market, the weakening of the target if talks fall through, 
and the avoidance of unnecessary turbulence within the markets as rumors 
and poor-quality information is spread.271 As a result, only a small number 
of company officials are involved in merger and acquisition negotiations.  
The description of the talks over the AOL-Time Warner merger provide an 
illustrative example:
[AOL CEO Steve] Case flew to New York to meet [Time Warner 
CEO Jerry] Levin for a private dinner.  To avoid being spotted 
together, they booked a suite at Manhattan’s Rihga Royal 
Hotel . . . and ordered room service.
It was an unforgettable evening, that dinner of November 1, 
1999.  Getting to know each other, Case and Levin talked the night 
away.  They had so much in common—a love of fine wines, for 
example.  More crucially, they were on a common mission.  
Business was not just about making money, they agreed; it was 
about integrity, and values, and the greater good, and making a 
difference. 
. . . .
270 The Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), 
78n(d)–(e) (2018)).  See also Howard F. Mulligan, Note, The Continuing Validity of State Takeover 
Statutes—A Limited Third Generation, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 412, 413 (1987) (“[T]he act makes 
it unlawful for any person to make a tender offer for more than five percent of the equity securities 
of a 34 Act company, unless the offeror at the time of the offer has filed a schedule with the SEC, 
including any solicitation materials prepared in connection with the offer.”).
271 See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 234–35 (1988) (“To avoid a ‘bidding war’ over 
its target, an acquiring firm often will insist that negotiations remain confidential, and at least one 
Court of Appeals has stated that ‘silence pending settlement of the price and structure of a deal is 
beneficial to most investors, most of the time.’” (citations omitted)).
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By the end of the evening, Levin and Case were of one mind.  
Together they could create the world’s most powerful and 
respected Internet-driven media and entertainment company.  
They’d make the world a better place.272
Although the pool of involved parties expands as the merger moves 
forward, the key components of the deal remain tied to decisions made early 
on, and the CEOs retain the ultimate authority.  The deal must eventually be 
approved by the board of directors and, in most mergers, the shareholders, 
but the merger is something of a fait accompli by the time it reaches these 
groups.  Presumably the board has the benefit of due diligence conducted by 
investment banks which is designed to draw out any potential flaws in the 
merger.273 But there are reasons to believe that bankers will be predisposed 
to support a deal.274 Moreover, diligence is conducted in incredibly short 
periods of time.275 Critics contend that the process is window dressing as a 
prelude to the formal announcement.276 And despite their role in approving 
most mergers, shareholders have a largely passive role in the combination, 
with approvals in the vast majority of cases.277
There is reason for concern that the market for corporate control does 
not lead to a highly efficient and value-generating market.  Because tender 
offers and proposed acquisitions generally need to pay more than the shares’ 
current market price, there can be large abnormal returns for the target in the 
short term.278 But over the long term, evidence suggests that corporate 
combinations do not increase overall societal efficiency.  Studies on long-
272 NINA MUNK, FOOLS RUSH IN: STEVE CASE, JERRY LEVIN, AND THE UNMAKING OF AOL
TIME WARNER 142–43 (2004).
273 See, e.g., Robert J. Giuffra, Jr., Note, Investment Bankers’ Fairness Opinions in Corporate 
Control Transactions, 96 YALE L.J. 119, 121–25 (1986). For a narrative example of the role of 
financial advisors in a merger, see Emerald Partners v. Berlin, No. Civ.A. 9700, 2003 WL 
21003437, at *8–12 (Del. Ch. 2003).
274 MUNK, supra note 272, at 166 (noting that the two investment banking firms involved in 
the AOL Time Warner merger each received a fee of $60 million); Giuffra, supra note 273, at 127–
28 (noting that “investment banks face strong incentives to provide opinions that serve 
management’s interests”).
275 For the AOL Time Warner merger, banks were given three days over a weekend to prepare 
their fairness reports for the companies’ boards.  MUNK, supra note 272, at 161–62.  As one of the 
bankers involved in the opinions noted, “If you do a deal over a weekend, you take shortcuts. . . .  
In hindsight, it was sloppy.”  Id. at 163.
276 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, Fairness Opinions: How Fair Are They 
and What Can Be Done About It?, 1989 DUKE L.J. 27, 37–45 (1989) (discussing the conflicts of 
interest that might lead to such a result); Steven M. Davidoff, Fairness Opinions, 55 AM. U. L.
REV. 1557, 1587 (2006) (noting that some contracts provide that the bank will only be paid, or will 
be paid more handsomely, if the transaction is approved). 
277 See Yair Listokin, Management Always Wins the Close Ones, 10 AM. L. & ECON. REV.
159, 169–71 (2008).
278 Anup Agrawal & Jeffery F. Jaffe, The Post-Merger Performance Puzzle, in 1 ADVANCES 
IN MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 7 (Cary Cooper & Alan Gregory eds., 2000).
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term returns for corporate acquisitions have generally shown “strong 
evidence of abnormal under-performance[] following mergers.”279 The 
conventional wisdom is that corporate combinations do not bring long-term 
gains.280 Even those who question whether corporate combinations have 
generally poor results concede that a significant number of them have 
spectacularly poor results.281
Researchers have investigated the possibility that individual personality 
traits may have an outsized effect on the market for corporate combinations.  
For example, CEOs may be acting with hubris—an inflated sense of their 
own abilities and the transactions they seek to effectuate.282 This hubris may 
279 Id. at 37.  Afra Afsharipour & J. Travis Laster, Enhanced Scrutiny on the Buy-Side, 53 
GA. L. REV. 443, 446 (2019) (“Empirical studies of acquisitions consistently find that public 
company bidders often overpay for targets, imposing significant losses on bidder shareholders.  
Research also indicates that the losses represent true wealth destruction in the aggregate and not 
simply a wealth transfer from bidder shareholders to target shareholders.”); Bernard S. Black, 
Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV. 597, 602 (1989); Feng Gu & Baruch Lev, 
Overpriced Shares, Ill-Advised Acquisitions, and Goodwill Impairment, 86 ACCT. REV. 1995, 
1996–97 (2011).
280 See, e.g., ROBERT F. BRUNER, DEALS FROM HELL: M&A LESSONS THAT RISE ABOVE 
THE ASHES 14 (2005) (“The popular view is that M&A is a loser’s game.”); Robert G. Eccles,
Kersten L. Lanes & Thomas C. Wilson, Are You Paying Too Much for That Acquisition?, HARV.
BUS. REV. July–Aug. 1999, at 136, 136. (noting “30 years of evidence demonstrating that most 
acquisitions don’t create value for the acquiring company’s shareholders”); James A. Fanto, 
Braking the Merger Momentum: Reforming Corporate Law Governing Mega-Mergers, 49 BUFF.
L. REV. 249, 280 (2001) (“Evidence from past merger waves shows that public companies engaging 
in mergers underperform their peer companies that have not followed similar acquisition 
strategies.”); Sara B. Moeller, Frederik P. Schlingemann & René M. Stulz, Firm Size and the Gains 
from Acquisitions, 73 J. FIN. ECON. 201, 202 (2004) (finding that takeovers by large firms have 
destroyed $312 billion of shareholder wealth over twenty years); Gregory Zuckerman, Ahead of 
the Tape, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 2002, at C1 (“Mergers just don’t work.  A mountain of academic 
research shows most acquisitions end up costing shareholders . . . .”).
281 See BRUNER, supra note 280, at 95–338 (discussing particularly poor performers).  The 
AOL and Time Warner combination, known as “the worst deal in history,” laid waste to the market 
value of the new company and led to the departure of almost all of the executives responsible for 
the union.  KARA SWISHER, THERE MUST BE A PONY IN HERE SOMEWHERE: THE AOL TIME 
WARNER DEBACLE AND THE QUEST FOR A DIGITAL FUTURE 9–10 (2003).  Three years after the 
completion of the merger, shareholders in AOL Time Warner had lost over $200 billion in equity 
value.  MUNK, supra note 272, at 277.
282 Richard Roll has argued that corporate takeovers were generally a value-neutral 
proposition, and that therefore rational executives would not seek them out. Richard Roll, The 
Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, 59 J. BUS. 197, 197–98 (1986) (“It will be argued here 
that takeover gains may have been overestimated if they exist at all.”). In order to explain the 
frequency of combinations, Roll relied not on rational market theory, but rather managerial hubris.  
Id. at 199–200.  Relying on the empirical evidence that individual decisionmaking is not always 
rational, Roll noted that takeovers were an apt subject for such research, since takeovers reflect 
individual decisions. Id. at 199.  Given that the data, in his view, did not show added value from 
takeovers to the acquiring firm, Roll hypothesized that managerial hubris—namely, the notion that 
their (higher) valuation of the target was better than the market’s (lower) valuation—was 
responsible for takeover activity.  Id. at 199–200.
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be a product of two types of systematic irrationalities known as behavioral 
heuristics: the optimism bias and the commitment bias.  These two heuristics 
form what one commentator has labeled the optimism-commitment 
“whipsaw.”283 Scholars have keyed in on the effects of the optimism or over-
confidence bias on high-level corporate decisionmakers.284 The optimism 
bias is a documented phenomenon within financial markets.285 Subjects also 
believe that their talents are above average.286 Relatedly, evidence also 
suggests that individuals underestimate others’ abilities, especially those of 
their competitors.287
Another component of the optimism bias is the so-called “illusion of 
control.”  This irrationality means that “people not only think that they are 
better than average when skill or ability is relevant to outcomes, they 
sometimes believe that they have more control over outcomes than they 
do.”288 High-level corporate executives may use these traits to rise to the 
top.289 However, those same irrationalities may work against the company’s 
283 Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations 
Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 147 
(1997).
284 See, e.g., MAX H. BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 37–39 (3d 
ed. 1994) (discussing overconfidence among managers).
285 See, e.g., Werner F.M. De Bondt & Richard H. Thaler, Financial Decision-Making in 
Markets and Firms: A Behavioral Perspective, in 9 HANDBOOKS IN OPERATIONS RESEARCH AND 
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE: FINANCE 385, 389 (R. Jarrow et al. eds., 1995) (“Perhaps the most robust 
finding in the psychology of judgment is that people are overconfident.”).
286 See David Dunning, Judith A. Meyerowitz & Amy D. Holzberg, Ambiguity and Self-
Evaluation: The Role of Idiosyncratic Trait Definitions in Self-Serving Assessments of Ability, in
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 324, 324 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002) 
(finding that seventy percent of high school students in one study rated themselves above average 
in leadership skills, while only two percent ranked themselves below average on that dimension); 
Ola Svenson, Are We All Less Risky and More Skillful Than Our Fellow Drivers?, 47 ACTA 
PSYCHOLOGICA 143, 146 (1981) (finding that most drivers believe they are above-average drivers); 
Ezra W. Zuckerman & John T. Jost, What Makes You Think You’re So Popular? Self-Evaluation 
Maintenance and the Subjective Side of the “Friendship Paradox,” 64 SOC. PSYCH. Q. 207, 207 
(2001).  
287 A notable example of such behavior is the case of “Rahodeb,” the online user name for 
Whole Foods CEO John Mackey.  Mackey used his anonymous online account to praise Whole 
Foods and pillory competitor Wild Oats.  David Kesmodel & John R. Wilke, Whole Foods Is Hot, 
Wild Oats a Dud—So Said ‘Rahodeb’; Then Again, Yahoo Poster Was a Whole Foods Staffer, the 
CEO To Be Precise, WALL ST. J., July 12, 2007, at A1.
288 Russell Korobkin, Psychological Impediments to Mediation Success: Theory and
Practice, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 281, 288 (2001); see generally Ellen J. Langer, The 
Illusion of Control, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 311 (1975).
289 See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the 
Recent Financial Scandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal 
Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285, 288 (2004) (noting that “over-optimism, an inflated sense of self-
efficacy and a deep capacity for ethical self-deception are favored in corporate promotion 
tournaments, so that people who possess them are disproportionately represented in executive 
suites”); Donald C. Langevoort, The Organizational Psychology of Hyper-Competition: Corporate 
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fortunes when applied to business decisions.  And in fact, research has shown 
that executive overconfidence has demonstrated effects on corporate 
decisionmaking.  According to the research, executive overconfidence leads 
to excessive entry into unfamiliar markets,290 overpaying in the context of 
auctions,291 an overreliance on the executive’s personal information and 
perspective,292 and a belief that the market is undervaluing the executive’s 
own company.293 As a result, executive overconfidence may lead to a 
consistent pattern of overconfidence in one’s judgments and abilities.294 The 
“whipsaw” phenomenon combines this tendency towards overconfidence 
with a commitment to one’s positions, even when it is clear that the original 
idea was a bad one.295 This reluctance to abandon prior sunk costs is known 
as the commitment bias.296 Studies have demonstrated this bias within the 
corporate world.297
The market for corporate control is almost a perfect convergence of a 
high-negotiability market: high stakes, individuated sales, personal and 
secret negotiations, significant individual decisionmaking power, and fairly 
limited review. The possibility for widely divergent prices would not be as 
problematic if the transactions only involved individual wealth.  But CEOs 
are using shareholders’ value and property in effectuating these deals.  It is 
not their money.  In fact, the deals are often structured to make sure that the 
executives involved are paid handsomely, no matter how good the deal is for 
their side.298
Irresponsibility and the Lessons of Enron, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 968, 969 (2002).  For a brief 
overview of the tournament theory for managerial talent, see Iman Anabtawi, Explaining Pay 
Without Performance: The Tournament Alternative, 54 EMORY L.J. 1557, 1586–87 (2005).
290 Colin Camerer & Dan Lovallo, Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experimental 
Approach, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 306, 306 (1999).
291 See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER’S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF 
ECONOMIC LIFE 50–60 (1992).
292 Antonio E. Bernardo & Ivo Welch, On the Evolution of Overconfidence and 
Entrepreneurs, 10 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 301, 302 (2001).
293 J.B. Heaton, Managerial Optimism and Corporate Finance, 31 FIN. MGMT. 33, 34 (2002); 
Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment, 60 J. FIN.
2661, 2662 (2005).
294 Directors can also suffer from optimism bias.  Ted Turner, a Time Warner board member 
and its largest shareholder, announced that he had voted for the 2000 merger “with as much or more 
excitement and enthusiasm as I did when I first made love some forty-two years ago.”  MUNK,
supra note 272, at 179.
295 See Langevoort, Organized Illusions, supra note 283, at 147.
296 See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, Behavioral Finance and Investor Governance, 59 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767, 782–83 (2002).
297 See, e.g., Barry M. Staw, Rationality and Justification in Organizational Life, in 2
RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 45, 57–58 (Barry M. Staw & Larry L. Cummings eds., 
1980); Charles R. Schwenk, Information, Cognitive Biases, and Commitment to a Course of Action, 
11 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 298, 298 (1986).
298 When a small company is being merged into a bigger company, the so-called “target” 
company will often pay its departing executives a “golden parachute” to insure a soft landing from 
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Corporate law has a variety of mechanisms to protect various players, 
especially shareholders, against opportunism within the system.  As an 
example, when a majority shareholder is buying out minority shareholders, 
the obvious conflict of interest is managed through a set of special voting 
mechanisms or the “entire fairness” test.299 Mechanisms are more limited, 
however, when it comes to protections against bad negotiating.  As noted 
earlier, deals must generally be approved by both the board of directors and 
the shareholders.  But given the crush of time, the availability of information, 
the rational ignorance of shareholders, and the potential for onerous deal 
protection provisions, these approvals may not be a sufficient filter for badly 
negotiated deals.
Shareholders in a target company also have the appraisal remedy if they 
are not comfortable with the deal.  Under state law, appraisal allows the 
stockholder to forego the merger consideration and instead file a judicial 
proceeding to determine an alternative fair value of the shares.300 Long 
derided as creaky, cumbersome, and little used,301 appraisal became more 
popular in the early 2000s and even led to “appraisal arbitrage,” the practice 
of purchasing shares after a merger’s announcement with the intent of using 
the appraisal remedy..302 In response to concerns of litigation opportunism, 
the Delaware legislature amended its corporate law to make appraisal suits 
more difficult to bring.303 And in 2017, the Delaware Supreme Court issued 
two important decisions emphasizing that deal price was the primary 
measure of fair value for lower courts to use in appraisal proceedings.304
Delaware’s changes to the appraisal doctrine seem to have weakened the 
remedy significantly.305
the departure.  Companies also give executive bonuses when they are on the acquiring end of the 
deal.  According to one study, the acquiring company’s CEO received a gratuitous multimillion-
dollar bonus in about forty percent of acquisitions.  Yaniv Grinstein & Paul Hribar, CEO 
Compensation and Incentives: Evidence from M&A Bonuses, 73 J. FIN. ECON. 119, 125–26 (2004).  
299 See Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 642 (Del. 2014) (“Where a transaction 
involving self-dealing by a controlling stockholder is challenged, the applicable standard of judicial 
review is ‘entire fairness,’ with the defendants having the burden of persuasion.”).
300 Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage and the Future of Public 
Company M&A, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1551, 1553 (2015); see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262.
301 Korsmo & Myers, supra note 300, at 1553 (noting the “prevailing academic view” that 
appraisal was “seldom utilized” and “too cumbersome for stockholders to call upon profitably”).
302 Id. at 1153–56.
303 The amendments required appraisal petitioners to meet threshold requirements, such as 
the consideration for the shares equaling at least $1 million, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(g), and 
also allowed corporations to reduce the amount of pre-judgment interest that they potentially owed.  
Id. § 262(h).
304 Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 5, 23–24 (Del. 
2017); DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 366 (Del. 2017).
305 Wei Jiang, Tao Li & Randall Thomas, The Long Rise and Quick Fall of Appraisal 
Arbitrage 51 (Vand. U. L. Sch. Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 20-16, 2020), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3546281 (finding that “while the returns to appraisal arbitrage were 
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The merits of a stronger appraisal remedy are much debated: 
proponents cite to evidence that target companies received better deals in the 
shadow of a stronger appraisal remedy,306 while opponents lack faith in a 
judicial system of valuation.307 Both the opponents and the Delaware 
Supreme Court place significant trust in the “market price” as negotiated 
between the parties.308 The Court has also focused on the specifics of the 
process, with the negotiated price receiving deference if proper procedures 
have been followed.309 But the market for corporate control has significantly 
high negotiation variance when it comes to the actual assessment of the 
corporation’s control premium.  The idea of one particular “market price” 
becomes more akin to a “market price zone” with considerable discretion 
within.  As such, there should be less faith that this market would find the 
appropriate price on its own.
A comprehensive review of the merger process and its regulatory 
oversight are beyond the scope of this paper.  But the market for corporate 
control is notable for its combination of high negotiation variance and high 
stakes.  The law of corporate combinations reflects the tension between the 
traditional approach of leaving people to their bargains and the desire to 
protect people—especially weaker parties—from the consequences of bad 
negotiating.  Courts, lawmakers, and commentators should more explicitly 
robust during 2000–2014, they fell drastically in 20152109 [sic] because of changes to the 
Delaware appraisal statute and adverse opinions of the Delaware Supreme Court in the DFC Global
and Dell cases”).
306 See Audra Boone, Brian Broughman & Antonio J. Macias, Merger Negotiations in the 
Shadow of Judicial Appraisal, 62 J.L. & ECON. 281, 283 (2019) (“We find—consistent with 
shareholder protection—that shareholders of Delaware targets receive higher acquisition premiums 
and abnormal returns following events that strengthen the appraisal remedy compared with deals 
involving non-Delaware targets over the same period.”).
307 William J. Carney & Keith Sharfman, The Death of Appraisal Arbitrage: Ending 
Windfalls for Deal Dissenters, 43 DEL. J. CORP. L. 61, 109 (2018) (“We have mainly argued here 
for reliance on the pre-deal market price for share valuation in appraisal litigation involving public 
companies.  To achieve this result, the courts would simply need to give actual respect to market 
prices rather than merely pay them lip service as the Supreme Court has consistently done, most 
recently in Dell and DFC.”).
308 DFC, 172 A.3d at 349 (“[E]conomic principles suggest that the best evidence of fair value 
was the deal price, as it resulted from an open process, informed by robust public information, and 
easy access to deeper, non-public information, in which many parties with an incentive to make a 
profit had a chance to bid.”); Charles Korsmo & Minor Myers, The Flawed Corporate Finance of 
Dell and DFC Global, 68 EMORY L.J. 221, 224 (2018) (“The Supreme Court’s message to the trial 
courts is simple: absent a culpable breach of duty, trust the market and have faith in the negotiated 
price.”).
309 DFC, 172 A.3d at 349 (noting that “the transaction resulted from a robust market search 
that lasted approximately two years in which financial and strategic buyers had an open opportunity 
to buy without inhibition of deal protections”); Guhan Subramanian, Appraisal After Dell, in THE 
CORPORATE CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMES 222, 226 (Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall 
Stuart Thomas eds., 2019) (recommending a safe harbor if the process is “pristine”).
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take the negotiation process into account and understand the role that 
negotiation effectiveness can play in this high-variance market.
3. Market for Employment
As a general matter, the market for employment has a high variance 
based on negotiated outcomes.  A number of factors contribute to this 
negotiability: the uniqueness of each person’s match to a particular job; the 
importance of employment to the applicant; the fact that employment is a 
status market;310 the difficulty in obtaining clear and reliable information 
about the applicant and the employer; the expectation of negotiation; and the 
general lack of pay transparency.  
The law has generally focused on structural issues within the 
employment market that disadvantage larger swathes of workers.  The 
National Labor Relations Act311 is specifically directed at the “inequality of 
bargaining power” between employees and employers and provides a 
mechanism for collective representation.312 Along with the rights to act 
collectively, the key provision is the requirement that both unions and 
employers bargain together in good faith over terms and conditions of 
employment.313 Good-faith bargaining focuses both on procedural concerns, 
such as time spent, as well as negotiating tactics, such as openness to 
compromise.314 But the parties are not required to agree, nor are they 
required to make any substantive proposals.  Labor law is primarily about 
shifting the structure of the labor market from one of individual bargaining 
to one of collective negotiation.315 The negotiation effectiveness of the 
parties can play a significant role in specific bargaining sessions, but the law 
does not do much to police the bargaining behavior of the parties.
As to individual employees, the primary legal interventions are 
mandatory minimums and antidiscrimination provisions.  One of the first 
mandatory terms was the ban on yellow-dog contracts; employers could not 
bargain with employees to forego their right to unionize.316 Many more have 
310 ASPERS, supra note 149, at 88.
311 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69.
312 Id. § 151.
313 Id. § 158(a)(5), (b)(3).
314 Id. § 158(d).
315 Archibald Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1401, 1407 (1958) 
(“The most important purpose of the Wagner Act was to create aggregations of economic power 
on the side of employees countervailing the existing power of corporations to establish labor 
standards.”).  One popular suggested reform is the move to sectoral bargaining, rather than 
enterprise bargaining; see, e.g., Kate Andrias, Union Rights for All: Toward Sectoral Bargaining 
in the United States, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF U.S. LABOR LAW FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 56, 57–59 (Richard Bales & Charlotte Garden eds., 2020).
316 See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: 
The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017, 1037 n.146 (1996) (“‘Yellow 
dog contracts’ are employment contracts in which workers promise not to join a union in order to 
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followed, including minimum wage and overtime provisions,317 unpaid 
family and medical leave,318 workplace safety requirements,319 health 
insurance coverage,320 and unemployment insurance.321 These required 
terms circumvent the need to bargain.  In addition, federal antidiscrimination 
provisions shield those who fall into protected classes.322 The law of 
employment structures the basics of the relationship such that employers and 
employees know that a certain foundational level of wages and benefits will 
be offered, no matter what the parties negotiate.
Within these constraints, however, there still exists for many workers a 
range of possible outcomes that varies depending on negotiation 
effectiveness.  And the variance can play out in troubling ways.  As discussed 
in Part II, significant discrepancies in pay for women and people of color 
persist despite antidiscrimination provisions.323 The Equal Pay Act of 1963 
was an effort to rectify the imbalance between men’s and women’s salaries 
by requiring equal pay for equal work.324 The statute specifies that 
employees shall not be paid less based on gender if they are doing “equal 
work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and 
responsibility, and which are performed under similar working 
conditions.”325 Much of the debate over gender-based pay discrepancies has 
centered around comparable worth—namely, the extent to which different 
types of jobs which have different gender profiles should nevertheless have 
similar wage structures because their positions are comparable.326 However, 
even the basics of fair pay—the notion that people in the same job 
description should have the same pay structure—have proven exceedingly 
difficult to effectuate.  Because such claims can be difficult to unearth, 
obtain employment.  They were prevalent in the early decades of the twentieth century and were 
approved by the Supreme Court in the Hitchman Coal and Coppage cases.”). The Norris-
LaGuardia Act banned such contracts.  Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, § 3, 47 Stat. 70, 70 (1932), 
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 103).
317 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 206–07 (providing for federal minimum wages and overtime).
318 Id. §§ 2601–54 (providing for family and medical leave).
319 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–78.
320 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a).
321 See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW 1051 (7th ed. 2011) 
(“Fifty states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico have individual unemployment insurance 
(UI) programs determining the length of unemployment insurance benefits and their amounts for 
qualifying recipients.”).
322 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (prohibiting discrimination against employees based on 
race, sex, ethnicity, or religion); 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (prohibiting discrimination against employees 
based on age); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (prohibiting discrimination against employees based on 
disability).
323 See Part II.C.4 supra.
324 Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (1963) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)).
325 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).
326 See, e.g., Janice R. Bellace, Comparable Worth: Proving Sex-Based Wage Discrimination, 
69 IOWA L. REV. 655, 655, 658 n.16 (1984).
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Congress was moved to extend the statute of limitations for such claims to 
allow for after-the-fact discovery.327 But because individual workers are 
generally loath to share salary information, workers may never find out about 
the disparity no matter how long they have to file a suit.328 Some employers 
may further inhibit disclosure by trying to label salary information 
confidential.
Academics have generally approached these complex issues of pay 
discrimination as a combination of discrimination and information disparity, 
and many have proposed that transparency as a reform.329 Undoubtedly, 
information about co-workers’ pay would inform employee efforts to make 
sure they are paid appropriately.  But negotiation plays a role here as well. 
Certain groups may not negotiate for the same level of salary, either because 
of individual preferences, societal norms, or discrimination against hard 
bargaining by those groups.330 As a result, employers may have systemic 
and even severe pay disparities without intentional discrimination due to 
negotiating disparities.331
The proposed Paycheck Fairness Act332 endeavors to address the issue 
of negotiation difference.  The legislation would broaden the scope for 
comparable pay, tighten up exceptions to the Equal Pay Act, and provide for 
compensatory and punitive damages.333 On the information front, it would 
require employers to disclose salaries to the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission and would protect workers against retaliation for talking about 
their pay with other employees.334 The Department of Labor would be tasked 
with “conducting and promoting research . . . [surrounding] pay disparities, 
with specific attention paid to women and girls from historically 
underrepresented and minority groups.”335 But in addition to these 
provisions, the Act would provide funding for the Secretary of Labor to 
327 Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 3, 123 Stat. 5, 5.
328 See Bierman & Gely, supra note 176, at 176; Edwards, supra note 176, at 55–56.
329 See, e.g., Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Money, Sex, and Sunshine: A Market-Based 
Approach to Pay Discrimination, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 951, 958 (2011) (“[G]ender pay discrimination 
should be viewed as a market failure caused, in part, by pay secrecy and information asymmetries 
about market wages.”); Cynthia Estlund, Extending the Case for Workplace Transparency to 
Information About Pay, 4 UC IRVINE L. REV. 781, 783 (2014) (“I conclude that there is a fairly 
strong though not uncomplicated case to be made that mandatory disclosure of meaningful salary 
information would tend to produce less discrimination, less favoritism, and probably somewhat 
lower disparities overall.”); Gowri Ramachandran, Pay Transparency, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 1043, 
1046–47 (2012) (proposing incentives for employers to provide pay transparency).
330 See Part II.C.4 supra.
331 Ramachandran, supra note 329, at 1045 (“[N]either the employer nor the employee is 
entirely at ‘fault,’ in the commonly understood sense of the term, when that employee has been 
socialized not to apply for certain jobs or to ask for more money.”).
332 Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R. 7, 116th Cong. (2019).
333 Id. § 3.
334 Id. §§ 3(b), 8.
335 Id. § 6(a)(1).
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“make grants on a competitive basis to eligible entities to carry out 
negotiation skills training programs for the purposes of addressing pay 
disparities, including through outreach to women and girls.”336 The grants 
would be available for state and local governments, as well as private 
nonprofits.  The Department would also have to implement regulations or 
policy guidance providing for the integration of negotiation skills training 
into existing programs at the Departments of Labor and Education.337 After 
eighteen months, the Secretary would provide a report on the Department’s 
training efforts.338
The Paycheck Fairness Act’s efforts to explicitly address negotiation 
disparities illustrates an understanding of the role of negotiation in 
cementing and deepening discriminatory practices even after overt 
discrimination has been addressed.  When examining markets such as 
employment for their inefficiencies and injustices, academics and 
policymakers have looked to structural economic bargaining power and 
information asymmetries to address market problems.  But disparities in 
negotiation effectiveness are an important factor, too.  We should determine 
whether markers have a high or low negotiation variance, and if high, then 
whether there are systemic disparities caused by differences in negotiation 
effectiveness.
CONCLUSION
The technological advances of the twenty-first century are rapidly 
changing many marketplaces.  Online auctions have loosened time and place 
restrictions to enable bidding for extended periods with participants from all 
over the world.  Web-based merchants such as Amazon allow for the 
convenience of delivery and a wealth of potential choices—along with the 
fear that its efficiencies will enable it to consume the marketplace.339 Social 
media companies provide their services to users at no monetary cost but take 
in enormous amounts of data and then charge advertisers for access.340
Website shopping algorithms find the best deals for customers based on their 
336 Id. § 5(a)(2).  
337 Id. § 5(b) (covering programs under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 
20 U.S.C. §§ 6301–76, the Carl D. Perkins Career and Technical Education Act of 2006, 20 U.S.C. 
§§ 2301–08, the Higher Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., and Workforce 
Innovation and Opportunity Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 3101–3361).
338 Id. § 5(c).
339 Stacy Mitchell, Amazon Doesn’t Just Want to Dominate the Market—It Wants to Become 
the Market, THE NATION, (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/amazon-
doesnt-just-want-to-dominate-the-market-it-wants-to-become-the-market/. 
340 Levmore & Fagan, supra note 6, at 1516.
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preferences.341 Our markets may develop radically transformed structures 
even sooner than we think.342
As we move into the future of capitalism, it is important to recognize 
and study the role of negotiation in market dynamics.  The law has largely 
not recognized the role of negotiation variance in markets explicitly, even 
though many doctrines evidence the ripples of this concern.  Scholars should 
identify negotiation variance as a factor and then research its effects within 
particular markets.  In some situations, transparency and disclosure of terms 
will equalize the playing field and eliminate whatever nefarious effects 
negotiation variance may have.343 However, in many markets negotiations 
will remain necessary to establish price and terms and to divide the surplus 
between parties.  Ignoring the role of bargaining or wishing it away does not 
realistically deal with the potential problems.
This Article is an effort to develop further study of the role of 
negotiation in markets, particularly in the field of law.  While much research 
on markets and negotiation has already been conducted in the fields of 
economics, behavioral psychology, social psychology, and sociology, more 
attention should be paid to the specific role of negotiation and the effects that 
negotiation variance has on the market players.  As we develop a more 
nuanced understanding of the interplay between bargaining, markets, 
transactions, and the law, we expect that the construction and regulation of 
markets will better handle the complexities of these interactions and provide 
for fairer allocations.
341 VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & THOMAS RAMGE, REINVENTING CAPITALISM IN THE 
AGE OF BIG DATA 61 (2018) (“[A] computer may be capable of transacting in the marketplace 
better than we can or, at the very least . . . can greatly aid humans in conducting market 
transactions . . . .”).
342 Id. at 212 (predicting that data will replace price as the salient aspect of transactions).
343 Levmore & Fagan, supra note 6, at 1470–71 (arguing that transparency in pricing and 
nonnegotiability will improve efficiency and lower costs). 
